| Institut de Stratégie Comparée, Commission Française d'Histoire Militaire, Institut d'Histoire des Conflits Contemporains |
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Soviet Sea Power Hervé Coutau-Bégarie
Chapter
I
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SSN5 |
SSN6 |
SSN8 |
SSN18 |
SSNX 17 |
SSNX 20 |
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model |
|
1 |
2 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
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date
commissioned |
1963 |
1968 |
1973 |
1973 |
1973 |
1975 |
|
1978 |
|
1983 ? |
1984 ? |
|
range
(nm) |
900* |
1300 |
1600 |
1300 |
4200 |
4900 |
3500 |
4200 |
3500 |
1800
to 2400 |
4500 |
|
fuel |
liquid |
solid |
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number
of stages |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
3 |
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number
and power of warheads |
1x1Mt |
3x 200kt (MRV) |
1x1Mt |
3x 200kt (MRV) |
1x 1Mt |
7x 200kt (MRV) |
1x 1Mt cap.MIRV |
12x 200kt (MRV) |
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guidance |
inertial |
inertial-stellar |
inertial |
inertial-stellar |
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submerged launch |
yes |
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counterforce capability |
no |
limited |
? |
limited |
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availability |
operational |
being
developed |
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carrier submarine |
H
II |
Y
I |
H
III D
I-D II |
D
III |
Y
II |
T |
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number |
18** |
400 |
292 |
208 |
12*
+ |
20
+ |
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The
employment conditions for Soviet submarines differ profoundly from those
of the Americans: While the latter permanently keep the maximum number of
submarines on patrol, the operational availability of their Soviet
counterparts is rather feeble: There are hardly more than four Yankee
submarines on station usually, with three of them in the Atlantic and one
in the Pacific, in other words, less than 157 of the Yankee
submarines in service and perhaps half a dozen Delta submarines.
The others remain hidden in their fortified pens at the base of Poliarniy
in the Arctic and at the Petropavlovsk base in the Pacific. This is a
consequence of the shortage of skilled personnel, which means that there
is only one crew per submarine instead of the two crews for the western
navies. Others emphasize the ease of maintenance deriving from this [9]
or they mention the technical problems which the Yankee class
creates and which explain the prolonged survival of the Hotel submarines
– but the availability of the Delta submarines is not any better
– or the deficiencies of the control and communication system. But
this state of affairs can also be blamed on the missions assigned to
Soviet strategic submarines
Richard
Ackley listed three
conceivable missions for the Soviet submarines: Striking at land targets,
such as the American nuclear missile submarines; fleet attack; strategic
reserve, which the Americans call “intra‑war deterrence”
or “war termination bargaining” [10].
The weakness of the permanent deployment appears to him to be rather
little compatible with the first, while the second one seems to be
little credible to him and while he selects the third one which seems to
him to be perfectly in keeping with the minimum deployment; massive
deployment would expose the Yankee submarines to rapid destruction
in case of the opening of hostilities. The few units on patrol will
participate in the initial nuclear exchange while the other ones, leaving
their bases, would constitute a reserve protected by the ASW forces which
could be used in a new strike or which could constitute a means for
negotiation. The sortie by the Delta class does not contradict this
assumption because, while it does confer new flexibility upon the
submarine force, it contributes above all to increasing its survival
capacity.
Carl
Clawson [11]
countered the statements by Ackley;
for him, the primary mission of the Yankee submarines is not
strategic; it is to attack the enemy missile‑carrying units. He
bases his idea on the many Soviet writings that assign first priority to
the fight against missile‑launching vessels, as well as certain
features of the Yankee submarines, such as, great speed, high
sound level, absence of inertial navigation system, shape of missile
tubes, and testing, at the beginning of the 1970’s, of a tactical
missile, the SSNX13. Only after the tactical‑missile submarine program
was finished, did the Soviets undertake the development of the Delta
class for strategic purposes. Although limited to the Yankee
submarines, this demonstration is more ingenious than really convincing.
The SSNX13 missile, which Clawson makes so much of, was never
deployed, either for technical reasons or because of the SALT agreements;
the features of the SSNX13 could lead to its inclusion in the strategic
missiles that are limited by agreement. More recently, when the Soviets
wanted to assign the Yankee submarines to tactical missions,
they were deprived of their strategic missiles, thus showing that, while
they do not separate the strategic nuclear level from the tactical level
in theory, they do not confuse strategic submarines and nuclear attack
submarines in practice.
If
we thus eliminate this mission of attacking enemy vessels, it is probable
that the strategic ocean force constitutes a reserve to be used in a
second strike in case the initial exchange remained limited, since its
potential on patrol gives it only a marginal place in the initial exchange [12].
But it would remain vulnerable: Contrary to what Ackley
and Mac Gwire suggest, the
minimum deployment offers only disadvantages; in particular, it seems
doubtful that it would improve the survival chances of the submarines; the
latter could be attacked in their bases with nuclear weapons – the Kola
and Kamchatka peninsulas, which are practically deserts, are
particularly well suited for an atomic counterforce strike – or they
would be bottled up in those same bases by very sophisticated mines, such
as the captor. The ASW capabilities of the U.S. Navy are considerable,
with its maritime patrol aircraft, its highly perfected detection
networks

for which the Soviets have no equivalent, its Los Angeles‑class
nuclear attack submarines, which are very silent and which are equipped
with highly sophisticated listening systems, making them particularly
suitable for hunting submarines [13].
The second‑strike capability – to use the easy Western concept
– has been assured since the commissioning of the Delta
submarines but it remains still relatively limited; the Soviet strategic
ocean force could suffer considerable damages once a conflict has been
unleashed. Ian Bellany [sic]
has drawn a significant comparison: “Out of the total capacity of the
Soviet SLBM, only one quarter (at best) is at sea, available at any
moment. Out of that quarter, more than half (the Yankee submarines) are
constantly sailing under the threat of Western ASW forces. In other
words, out of the 950 SLBM allowed the Soviet Union under the SALT
agreements, one can reasonably count only on about 120 to participate in a
second strike. Out of the 710 SLBM allowed the United States, 350 are
available for a second strike – an obvious advantage even if one takes
into account the greater weight of the Soviet warheads” [14].
These
very real weaknesses must not cause us to forget that the strategic ocean
force has made impressive progress and that the deployment of the SSN18
and the SSN17 will considerably boost its potential and thus its place in
Soviet strategy. As Richard Burt put it: “With a production rate of
six submarines per year, their force of 62 submarines could be made up
almost entirely of Delta and new Typhoon submarines in 1985. If, for any
reason whatsoever, the restrictions contained in the 1972 accord should
become outdated, Moscow could quickly increase its strategic submarine
force to about 90 units by deploying new submarines and by keeping the
older Yankee submarines. But beyond the simple growth of the ocean
force of the USSR, its increased ability to threaten new targets in the
United States, particularly rather little protected military targets, such
as the bomber bases, would give it a new dimension” [15].
Only the very serious personnel problems could then hinder its development
and limit its effectiveness.
The
defensive mission is a twin mission: On the one hand, it consists in
protecting the strategic ocean force against Western ASW attacks; on the
other hand, it is aimed at limiting the effects of a nuclear strike
against the Soviet Union by locating and destroying the maximum number of
enemy strategic submarines before they have launched their missiles. It is
fundamental, from both of these aspects, because the Soviets are very
much afraid of the American ASW potential and because, having been
hard‑hit by two very murderous and destructive invasions in the
course of two world wars, they put the protection of their territory above
everything else and are trying very hard to reduce the losses which they
would suffer to a minimum, not only through a very broad passive defense
but also through active defenses against bombers – 10 000 AA
positions – missiles, with different but very intensive research efforts
on all possible forms of antimissile defense, as well as submarines.
The
two aspects of the defensive mission are closely tied together; in both
cases, the basic idea is to destroy the submarines [16],
either the missile firing submarines or the submarine‑hunting
nuclear attack submarines which constitute the main threat to the
missile‑firing submarines; this, in passing, reveals the very vague
character of the distinction made by many authors between strategic ASW
and tactical ASW [17].
Soviet
doctrine distinguishes two zones. In the close‑in zone, the
essential means are surface vessels and ASW aircraft. They no longer have
to track the American submarines whose Polaris and Poseidon
missiles have a range that enables them to stay outside that zone. However,
their role is not over: More than ever before, they must protect the
Soviet missile‑firing submarines against Western nuclear attack
submarines. They could regain a strategic role if the American nuclear
attack submarines were to receive the cruise missile whose range, 1,500
nm, would force them to patrol permanently close to the Soviet coast. And,
on the other hand, one cannot rule out an enlargement of the
close‑in zone: The latest developments in Soviet naval shipbuilding
suggest several indications along these lines [18].
Even if we look only at the strategic mission – which is no longer
sufficient to include the evolution of the Soviet fleet – it is certain
that the Soviets will continue to build surface vessels.
In
the remote zone, the Soviets quickly understood that surface vessels
cannot venture further and further out into a hostile environment in order
to keep up with the increase in the range of the Polaris. The series of Moskva
helicopter carriers, designed for action against the Polaris in the
Eastern Mediterranean, was thus stopped after only two units, while the
program initially, according to western estimates based on supplies for
the shipyards, pointed to a series of between eight and twelve ships. The
fight against American strategic submarines and protection for the missile‑firing
submarines, the Hotel and Yankee classes, in the remote
zone, henceforth will be primarily a job for the nuclear attack
submarines armed with torpedoes. The five Echo I [19],
which are old missile‑firing submarines converted into nuclear
attack submarines, and the November submarines are very noisy
and rather unsuccessful from all viewpoints: A November submarine
sank in the Atlantic in April 1970. They should be withdrawn shortly [20].
The backbone of the torpedo‑firing nuclear attack submarine force
consists of the Victor class whose three versions, apparently
differing little, followed each other after 1968: 16 Victor I
were built between 1968 and 1974, six Victor II were built between
1972 and 1978, and ten Victor III were built after that; production
continues, parallel to the introduction of the Alpha class whose
first copy came out in 1979. At this time there are six of them; the
production rate is slow (about one unit per year) due to their complexity
and their cost. Highly sophisticated, they have a titanium hull which
gives them very deep submersion – at least 900 m and there was even talk
of 1 200 m – and very great speed, at least 40 kn. On the other
hand, they would be even noisier than their predecessors [21].
In addition to their torpedoes, the Victor and Alpha
submarines are equipped with two ASW systems that can be launched
submerged: The SSN15 at 20 nm fires a nuclear grenade and the very recent
SSN16, with a range of at least 500 nm, is equipped with a nuclear torpedo
with a homing warhead. (It is not certain that it would be used at maximum
range because of radar spotting difficulties.) These are redoubtable
weapons, similar to the Subroc of the U.S. Navy.
The
naval air arm could also participate in the strategic ASW fight but it
only has about 50 ASW aircraft, that is, Tupolev 142 Bear F
with a big action radius (8 000 km). The 50 Ilyushin 28 May
(3 000 km action radius) and the 90 Mail hydroplanes (1 000‑1 300
km action radius) cannot operate in the areas patrolled by Poseidon
and Trident.
More
serious, on the other hand, is the prospect of mine warfare: “Submarines
or even transport vessels and fishing boats could secretly lay mines along
the routes of enemy SSBN and, in wartime, this would also be the task of
aircraft and surface vessels; the USSR would then accept the idea of
loosing many aircraft if this would force the American SSBN to remain
bottled up in port” [22].
But, in addition to the difficulties arising from the conduct of such an
operation, we must not forget that, in contrast to their Soviet
counterparts, more than half of the Western strategic submarines are
permanently at sea. The impact of a blockade or a nuclear attack on the
bases – anticipated by the Soviet strategists in spite of the
considerable risk of escalation – thus could in any case be only very
limited.
What could be the effectiveness of this hunt against Western strategic submarines being? Admiral W. Bagley recently sounded the alarm: “Technical improvements are strengthening Soviet capacities. Soviet progress is such that, strengthened by foreseeable progress in the matter of surveillance, they could progressively reduce the credibility of the Western SSBN in times of crisis”