Soviet Sea Power

Hervé Coutau-Bégarie 

 

Chapter II - General Military Missions

 

In 1961, the decision as to the forward deployment was intended primarily for the strategic ASW effort. The military missions of the Soviet fleet became diversified with the passage of time. Today the fleet has an impressive po­tential even though it is not without weaknesses, which renders it capable of accomplishing defensive and offensive missions, involving both the interdiction of free use of the sea by the adversary and an effort to achieve control of the sea for itself.

The Soviet navy has thus acquired the theoretical capability of accomplishing varied tasks. Does it have the intention to do so? We go back to the endless discussion between Michael Mac Gwire, who stresses the strategic ASW struggle and minimizes the other missions, and Robert Weinland and James Mac Connell who visualize a navy with several dimensions. As we said, neither an ex­amina­tion of the features of the ships, nor a study of the doctrines enable us to draw any final conclusions and nothing can be predicted as to the changes which war would introduce into plans drafted in peacetime. Under these con­di­tions, one cannot overlook any assumption: We must not stop with the most probable missions but we must also visualize those that are less probable so as to be aware of the multifaceted nature of the threat which Soviet maritime power poses for the Western countries.

 

The Soviet Navy’s Potential

The effort undertaken 20 years ago led to the con­struction of a very numerous fleet but the fluctuating logic of its development gives it a heterogeneous character and it still suffers from numerous weak points, having to do both with equipment and with crews as well as logistics.

 

The Units of the Navy

 

Submarines

Since the beginning of this century, the submarine has been the preferred weapon of Russia at sea even though it did not always use it successfully. At the end of 1981, the Soviet fleet had 288 attack submarines – plus about 115 overage units in reserve – of which 101 are nu­clear‑powered [1]. In contrast to the Americans, the Soviets did not discard the conventional sub­marine, which is less expensive than the nuclear attack submarines, easier to maintain, very sufficient against merchant shipping, and more suitable for operating in shallow waters.

Next we can say that 203 submarines are armed with torpedoes, 55 are nuclear and as we have seen are primarily assigned to hunting missile‑launching sub­ma­rines; but they are also tracking the nuclear attack subma­rines and could be used against surface vessels. The diesel submarines are old for the most part: The survivors of the Zulu class with a long action radius of 25 000 nm, Whisky and Romeo with a medium action radius of 13 000 nm, and Quebec with a short action radius of 7 000 nm are only used for crew training or utility missions such as radar pickets, target units; four Bravo submarines which are more recent and which are also used as target units at the rate of one per fleet; three Golf II, disarmed as strategic mis­sile‑launching submarines, were converted into command submarines. Their precise number is difficult to deter­mine because disarmament and assignment to reserve status followed each other rapidly. According to Les flottes de combat 1982, the following are still in service: Four Bravo, four Quebec, 61 Whisky, 1C Romeo, 11 Zulu IV. The Mili­tary Balance 1982‑1983 only mentions four Bravo, 50 Whisky, 10 Romeo, and 10 Zulu IV; this would suggest that the others have already been taken out of the inventory. Their retirement should be completed within a few years. The 60 Foxtrot submarines, which were very successful in their time, but which today are outt4oded, will follow them. For the moment, they are still used for operational pur­poses, especially in the Mediterranean. They could in par­ticular serve for mooring mines. The only modern series represented by the 15 Tango could, in addition to their tor­pedoes, get the ASk SSN15 and SSN16. The prototype of a new class, Kilo, came out in 1980; its features and destina­tion are not yet known. The current rate of construction of Tango submarines – one or two per year – is entirely insuf­ficient to ensure the replacement of the conventional tor­pedo‑firing submarine fleet which by the end of the decade will experience a dramatic decline.

Furthermore, 67 submarines are equipped with anti­surface missiles. The two Whisky Long‑Bin and the 16 Juliet, with diesel power, are armed with four outmoded SSN3 missiles; their guidance can be jammed by ECM; they are vulnerable to AA defenses because of their high‑altitude and slow flight and they can be launched only from the sur­face. They are about at the end of the road and should soon be scratched. The same is true of the 24 Echo II with nu­clear power, which carry eight SSN3 nuclear missiles. Five Echo II were re‑equipped with eight SSN12, much more highly perfected than the SSN3 (faster flight, lower flight path, hardened guidance against jamming) but likewise to be launched only from the surface, which limits their effec­tiveness con­siderably. On the other hand, the [illegible] 9 remaining nuclear attack submarines are armed with anti-surface missiles that can be launched submerged, against which there is hardly any way to stop them [sic]. The 12 Charlie I and the six Charlie II each carry eight SSN7 with a range of 25 nm and a conventional payload. The Papa, an experimental submarine that was not reproduced, carries ten of them. The Soviets have already developed a second generation with the SSN19, an improvement of the SSN12, which can be launched submerged with a payload that can be conventional or nuclear. Its maximum range is 300 nm; it is guided by a radar image given at the start by an air­craft or a satellite and it does not need any mid‑course guidance because of its very great speed; 24 SSN19 are car­ried by the new Oscar, the world’s biggest nuclear attack submarine with its 18 000 t on the surface and which has a titanium hull similar to that of the Alfa. Others are still under con­struction. The SSN19 could also be installed on the Yankee submarines that were converted into nuclear attack submarines; but their refitting seems to be running into difficulties; none of them has as yet joined the fleet. Morskoi Sbornik recently reported about a grandiose pro­ject involving a submarine with a displacement of 23 000 t and sailing at 65 kn. It is to be assumed that this kind of speed would be possible in water but it will certainly not be attained any time soon.

This impressive total of 250 submarines should not create any illusions. With the exception of 16 of them (the 15 Tango and the Kilo), all of the conventional submarines are old and for the most part even over‑age. As for the nu­clear attack submarines, Jean Labayle‑Couhat noted that “if we exclude the oldest Echo II and the very unsuccessful November submarines, which moreover are being progres­sively retired from service, we find that the Soviet navy only has about 80 modern nuclear attack submarines, in other words, hardly more than the U.S. Navy”  [2]. The priority given to strategic submarines, to the detriment of attack submarines, during the decade of the 1970’s, is responsible for this non renewal, which can compensate for the accel­eration in keel‑laying only after the strategic missile ceiling established by the SALT agreements has been attained. The result is a force, which, in 1987, will have 135 nuclear attack submarines and 95 conventional submarines; this figure should go down further and should level off by the middle of the 1990’s at about 100 nuclear attack subma­rines and 75 conventional submarines [3].

But what it will have lost in terms of numbers will be compensated for by gains in terms of quality. The sub­marine force will be younger, more homogeneous and will have a higher performance: “After a period of frequently awkward copying of western techniques, the Soviet navy and engineers are now displaying original thinking and a dy­namism aimed primarily at speed, submersion, and resis­tance” [4]. The Alfa series represents a major technological break­through, in spite of its persistent defects in terms of silence and electronic equipment. The Soviets also gained a tremendous advantage in the area of tactical anti surface missiles which can be launched submerged: They already have the second generation of such missiles, whereas the U.S. Navy is just completing the development of the sub‑Harpoon. The Soviet submarines thus have growing effectiveness and constitute the most redoubtable threat to the Western navies.

 

Surface Vessels

“Although they have yielded the leading role to the submarines and to naval aviation, surface vessels continue to remain an essential component of the navy”  [5]. During the decade of the 1970’s they underwent a profound renewal, which affected all categories.

 

Aircraft Carriers

The appearance of aircraft carriers [6] was the big event of the decade, abundantly commented upon even out­side naval circles. Until then, their absence prevented the Soviet fleet from attaining an equal footing with the Ameri­can navy. Robert Herrick described this as follows in 1968: “Even if the Soviet navy is second in tonnage after the U.S. Navy, its complete lack of an attack carrier force constitutes a fundamental qualitative difference” [7]. The two helicop­ter‑carrier cruisers, the Moskva and the Leningrad, com­missioned in 1967 and 1968, did not change this state of affairs inspired by the French helicopter‑carrier cruiser Jeanne d’Arc, they only carry 16 ASW helicopters and thus cannot give the fleet air cover. Until the end of the 1960’s, official doctrine continued to assert that air­craft carriers had become too vulnerable and that they could be used only against weak countries without any means of response. But, from that time on, divergent opinions appeared and Admiral Gorshkov, rejecting earlier analyses on the inevi­table decline of the aircraft carrier, wound up supporting it. The result of the new doctrine was the appearance of the 40 000 t aircraft carriers of the Kuril class; with the com­missioning of the Kiev in 1976, the Minsk in 1978, the Kharkov in 1982, and pending the commissioning of the Novorossisk, which should join the fleet around 1984, the USSR took a decisive step in the process of accruing flat‑tops.

Of course, they have as much of the cruiser as the aircraft carrier in them, with all of their forward section occupied by a formidable ASW and anti-surface missile ar­ray which gives them unparalleled fire power. Devoid of catapults and arresting gear, they can accommodate only VTOL aircraft and helicopters, with a total of about 30 air­craft. The helicopters are the [ASW Hornone; illegible in Photostat], the rather unsuccessful Forger aircraft (which exist in two versions: attack and reconnaissance). Their initial designation, big ASW cruisers, probably chosen to get around the Montreux Convention which bars aircraft carri­ers from going through the Turkish straits, expresses a spe­cific reality: These vessels are not comparable to the attack carriers of the U.S. Navy.

But that should not cause us to consider them only extrapolations of the Moskva. As noted by Jean La­bayle‑Couhat, “the Kiev units are multipurpose vessels whose missions appear to be as follows in order of impor­tance: Commanding a naval‑air force, ASW action, anti sur­face action, zone air de­fense, overseas intervention” [8]. But to do that, they must fall back as much on their very powerful armament as on their shipboard aviation. They supply the fleets to which they are assigned (Northern fleet for the Kiev, Pacific fleet for the Minsk; Kharkov will probably re­main in the Mediterranean) only with symbolic air cover with no effectiveness whatsoever against the air­craft of the U.S. Navy. And so far their operations have been very re­stricted because of numerous childhood diseases, which will be corrected on the Kharkov and the Novorossisk, judging by the delay in the completion of these two vessels. Their assignment to two theaters of operation not having any re­pair basins capable of receiving them has raised a mainte­nance problem, which was solved by purchasing two float­ing docks of 80 000 t. The first one, built in Japan, has been in place at Vladivostok since October 1978 but the Swedish dock, intended for Murmansk ran aground a few miles from the Pechenga base in November 1979. It was refloated by a Dutch firm but its commissioning was delayed by several months, thus forcing the Kiev to sail back to the Black Sea in January 1980 for careening at the Sebastopol arsenal.

In spite of their defects, the Kiev vessels – in addi­tion to their somewhat limited military value – also have a symbolic meaning: The Kiev got unusual publicity and its departure even wound up on the front cover of Morskoi Sbornik. It was the first vessel to be officially designated by its name. We can say without exaggeration that it relieved the Soviet navy of its inferiority complex with respect to the U.S. Navy and its aircraft carriers. In 1981, the Kiev vessels were rechristened aircraft‑carrying vessels, a change in name which hinted at and announced new developments leading to real flat‑tops; an aircraft carrier of 50 000 ‑ 60 000 t is under construction [9] and so undoubtedly is a second one. They will probably not join the fleet before the end of the decade. We still do not know anything about their specific features but it is believed that they will carry about 50 SU17 Fitter or SU24 Fencer bombers and Mig‑27 fighters modified for short takeoff (and no longer vertical takeoff, as in the case of the Forger aircraft) which will also be placed on the Kharkov and the Novorossisk. Catapulting tests have already been made. In any case, they will be far from being able to compete with their American rivals. But they will represent new progress by the Soviets in a sector of naval shipbuilding, which it was believed was beyond their competence just a few years ago.

 

Cruisers

The cruiser fleet comprises 38 units, 27 of which are equipped with missiles. It is very heterogeneous; there are outmoded vessels along with very modern ships.

The oldest date back to the decade of the 1950’s; they are the 12 survivors of the Sverdlov class, built after the war; nine still have their three triple turrets with 152mm guns and one of them was equipped with AA missiles. In the Western navies, such veterans would have been dis­armed long ago. But that is not the case in the USSR. One can find many reasons for this exten­sion; they are used for crew training, thus avoiding the need for having to assign the more recent units for this mission; they can support land opera­tions with their artillery; their impressive ap­pearance makes them particularly suitable for protocol vis­its to the Third world; even though they are completely outmoded, their simple presence is a factor which the ad­versary must take into account. But the main explanation is that the Soviets, accustomed to the big battalions, on the one hand, and dire shortage, on the other hand, are not re­tiring any weapon system, regardless of what it might be, until it is really on its last legs: Two other Sverdlov units were recently converted into command ships.

The decade of the 1960’s brought the introduction of two classes of anti­surface missile‑launching cruisers: The four Kynda units carry two SSN3 missiles which today are outdated and which have a range of 30 nm. The weakness of their AA armament makes them totally incapable of sur­viving in a hostile environment. The four Kresta I are better protected, with more AA armament. Their SSN3 missiles could reach a range of 170 nm with the help of the use of a shipboard helicopter, the Hormone B, which can handle target designation but which at the beginning of the 1970’s was replaced by a Hormone A ASW helicopter.

The decade of the 1970’s as a matter of fact was marked by the primacy of ASW defense. It was believed above all that the main armament of the new cruiser classes, which appeared in 1970‑1973 was an anti-surface missile of a new type, the SSN10. Around 1976, it was re­alized that this system as a matter of fact had primarily an ASW mission and so it was renamed the SSN14. It also has a certain anti-surface capability. The 10 Kresta II differ from the Kresta I only by virtue of this main armament. The seven Kara units, which are syntheses of the Kresta II and the Krivak destroyers, are bigger (10 000 t, fully loaded, instead of 7 600); they are very well armed and pre­sent very good nautical qualities and impressed Western observers greatly.

The decade of the 1980’s has brought a return to the priority anti-surface capability. The Kirov was commis­sioned in 1981; it is a mastodon of almost 25 000 t with nu­clear propulsion. It is armed with 20 surface‑to‑surface SSN19 missiles with a range of 300 nm (target designation can be provided by a Hormone B helicopter or a satellite), as well as Hormone A helicopters and SUWN1 and SSN14 ASW missiles, 12 new vertical‑launch SAN6 AA missiles, which can hit a target 40 nm away at a speed of Mach 6. Its radar and sonar equipment is very voluminous. It thus has a formidable offensive capacity, which turns it into a re­doubtable raider, suitable for operating in remote oceans, in conjunction with one or more Oscar submarines; but it also could be the command ship of a group and provide defense for an aircraft carrier. A second Kirov was launched in 1981; it is expected to go on active duty in 1984; it is distin­guished by a new AA system using a high‑energy laser or perhaps even a particle beam. The prototype of a new series of 12 000 t cruisers, the Krasina, intended to replace the Kara, joined the fleet in 1982 (the Krasina was earlier des­ignated by the symbol Black Com I: Black Sea Combatant; ships built in the Baltic are called Bal Com: Baltic Combat­ant, before their commissioning; the Kirov was Bal Com I). Three others are being completed. They have the armament of the Kara, reinforced by anti surface SSN19 missiles. The series could consist of eight units [10], while the Kirov series would consist of four.

 

Destroyers

There are 101 destroyers. They reveal the same het­erogeneity as the cruisers. Survivors of the decade of 1950, without missiles, the 12 Skory are in reserve, except for a few that are used for crew training and the 15 Kotlin will soon join them; one Kildin, armed with SSNl missiles, is used as target; three Kildin were rearmed with SSN2 C anti surface missiles; eight Kotlin Sam and eight Kanin, armed with SANl missiles, have a mostly AA defense mis­sion. In spite of their modernization, they are likewise be­ginning to get old. The 20 Kashin destroyers, dating back to the 1960’s, have a twin AA and ASW mission; six of them, modified between 1973 and 1975, furthermore received the SSN2 C anti-surface missiles and another one was assigned to air traffic control.

The only really modern ones are the 20 Krivak I and the 12 Krivak II (which differ by virtue of the 100 mm AA mounts on the II in place of the 76.2 mm mounts of the I), built during the 1970’s. In spite of their modest tonnage (3 600 t, fully loaded), these multipurpose vessels, with their ASW and anti­ surface SSN14 missiles, have a consid­erable fire power which, once again, greatly impressed Western observers. Jean Labayle‑Couhat however esti­mates that “their AV armament is very insufficient (four SSN14 missiles, two rocket launchers, and no helicopter) and certainly does not make them real ASW vessels” [11]. On the other hand, their AA armament (SAN4 missiles and 76.2­ mm or 100 mm cannon) provides only for zone defense. One thus could not without exaggeration liken them to cruisers, as certain hasty commentators have done. They are nevertheless very redoubtable units, equipped with much more perfected electronic equipment than that of their predecessors and having a towed sonar.

The year 1981 brought the appearance of two new and much heavier classes (7 500 – 8 500 t, fully loaded) and equipped with helicopters. The Sovremenny is mostly an AA ship; it has no towed sonar, which is indispensable for an action, and its main armament is a new anti surface missile with sea‑skimming trajectory, the SSNX22. The Udaloy has a primary ASW mission with its eight SSN14 missiles and its two new Helix ASW helicopters. It also seems to have a good AA capability with the new SAN8 missiles, the verti­cal‑launch version of the SAN4. (The Americans and Sovi­ets are working hard on vertical missile launch. More diffi­cult than conventional launch, this system offers numerous advantages: No dead angle, smaller size, and faster re­loading.) Their almost simultaneous appearance seems to express the universal trend of what we can observe in the West where the emphasis is on multipurpose vessels pri­marily for budget reasons. Jean Labayle‑Couhat empha­sizes that “the Udaloy ­Sovremennyi pair constitutes a very redoubtable combat group”  [12]. The prototypes are now in service and at least three copies of each of those two classes are being completed and others are on the slips. Several years ago, such vessels would have been considered as cruisers and they were initially listed as such. Their reclas­sification expresses the desire of the Soviet fleet to get more and more powerful vessels, suitable for operating on the high seas.

 

Coastal Vessels

The Soviets have a large number of coastal units which are particularly suit­able for ASW and AA defense of merchant shipping and short‑range support of ground op­erations in the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Pacific (Sea of Okhotsk and Sea of Japan). But they also venture out into the Mediterranean and all the way into the Indian Ocean, although such long cruises are very bothersome, both for the crews and the equipment of these vessels, which were certainly not designed for ocean‑going operations.

There are about a hundred frigates, of about 1 000 t, including the Petya, Mirka, and Riga classes, equipped with ASW rocket launchers and AA artillery. Two new Koni are much bigger (2 000 t, fully loaded) and they carry SAN4 AA missiles. By virtue of their tonnage (1 000 t, fully loaded), the 44 Grisha corvettes resemble the frigates and have a primary ASW mission. The smaller 62 Poti are beginning to get old and the 22 Nanuskha, armed with recent SSN9 [il­legible] anti-surface missiles, seem to be rather difficult to handle at sea. Two new classes, the Tarantul and the Pauk, have just come out. The Tarantul II carries the new SSNX22 anti-surface missile.

We must also add a rather impressive force of patrol craft and missile boats of 50‑200 t, numbering more than [illegible in Photostat] units. In spite of their very small tonnage, they should not be overlooked, especially since they have missiles, such as the famous Komar and Osa missile boats.

The Soviets are also expressing continued interest in hydrofoil vessels. The 330 t Sarancha, with its 45 kn, is the heaviest armed hydrofoil vessel in the world with four anti surface SSN9 and two AA SAN4. It was not reproduced. With an even bigger displacement, the 440 t Babochka has an ASW mission and also remained in the prototype stage. The two standard series are the 36 Turya, built in 1972‑1979, desplacing 220 t and making 42 kn with four torpedo‑launch tubes and the 14 Matka (production is con­tinuing) with an equivalent displacement, carrying two SSN2 C and one SAN7. A much bigger model, of at least 1 000 t, is reported to be under development.

 

Mine Warfare Vessels

The Soviets have always excelled in mine warfare. This is the only field in which they obtained significant re­sults during the war against Japan (1904­-1905) and World war II. They are also devoting special attention to this. Practically all submarines, surface vessels, and even bomb­ers of the naval air arm are equipped to plant mines; the Whisky submarines carry 20 or 24 mines; the Yankee sub­marines and the Delta submarines carry 36; the Foxtrot and Golf submarines carry 44; and the November and Victor submarines carry 64.

But there are naturally very many minesweepers, in other words, more than 300, total, and they are divided half into ocean‑going minesweepers and coastal minesweepers. Many are old but, during the 1970’s, several classes came out with wooden, plastic, and glass fiber hulls. The Soviet navy furthermore is practically the only navy to build mine‑laying vessels specifically designed for this task, with the three Alyosha, which carry 400 mines, each.

The Soviets have a very large stockpile; estimates vary between 300 000 and 600 000 mines. Most of them are old but there are also highly perfected recent models, espe­cially the very deep mines called Cluster Bay and Cluster Gulf by NATO; they are apparently intended for use against nuclear submarines. It is believed that the Soviets also have automatically triggered torpedo launch contain­ers, similar to the American Captor.

The threat is very serious; even the oldest mines are still effective, as proved by the war between India and Pakistan in 1971 (the Soviet mines laid by the Indians caused the loss of 24 Pakistani vessels totaling 100 000 t). It is all the more serious since the anti‑mine resources of the easterners are very weak, especially those of the U.S. Navy which has completely neglected this sector for a score of years and which would have tremendous trouble in cop­ing with a blockade using mines. The Soviet Union here has a weapon system, which is little talked about because it is not spectacular but its effectiveness is nevertheless re­doubtable.

 

Amphibious Vessels

The Soviet fleet’s amphibious resources remain ex­tremely feeble. The main landing vessels during the 1960’s were the Polnotsny barges with less than 1 000 t, incapable of carrying men and equipment over a long distance. The appearance of the Alligator lighters, with 4 500 t, repre­sented a big step forward. During the 1970’s, they were fol­lowed by the Ropucha, of equivalent tonnage, end in 1978, came the first really ocean‑going vessel, the Ivan Rogov, with 13 000 t; it features a very complex design and carries one battalion which it can put ashore by means of conven­tional barges, by heli­copters, or by hydrofoil vessels. But their number is very insufficient. Right now there are 55 Polnotsny, 14 Alligator, 11 Ropucha, and a single Ivan Rogov. A second Ivan Rogov is under construction. To this we can add the ships of the merchant navy among which three types are particularly useful for amphibious opera­tions: 12 recent passenger vessels of 16 500‑20 000 t, from the Byelorussia and Ivan Franko [illegible] classes, which would make excellent troop transports; two barge carriers of 38 000 t, of the Yulus Eushik class, each carrying 26 barges of 1 300 t; and a score of vessels, including four Magnitogorsk of 22 500 t, which proved their effectiveness during the Ethiopian affair. In 1979, a hospital ship, the first of its kind, was commissioned; it is the Ob, built in Poland. This kind of vessel is justi­fied only with a view to remote operations. In 1981, the Yenissey, an identical ves­sel, joined it.

But, for the time being, this amphibious potential does not give the Soviet Union any real overseas interven­tion capacity: “Soviet air transport amounts to only half of what the American aircraft can carry in terms of millions of tons per mile and per day (their aircraft have a shorter ac­tion radius than those of their American equivalents and they cannot be refueled in flight); the Soviet amphibious fleet can carry only 1/3 of the American capacity. The Soviet Ma­rines (although they number 12 000 men, they are twice as strong as 10 years ago) do not amount to 1/15 of the size of the U.S. Marine Corps; it remains an assault force, which has to be resupplied after a week, whereas the Marines can remain in action for a month without outside resupply. Even with the entry into service of the STOL aircraft of the Kiev vessels, Soviet ship­board aviation cannot rival the American shipboard aircraft in terms of action radius, endurance, and firepower. The USSR cannot attain the sophistication and effectiveness of the American resupply operations when the forces are under way; in the absence of sufficient shipboard aviation, Soviet resupply in a combat environment would be totally unfeasible” [13].

Nevertheless, the progress made during the 1970’s must not be underestimated: Although the Ropucha and Alligator vessels do not have an ocean‑going capa­bility, they would nevertheless be quite sufficient for operations in close‑in areas, such as the Baltic or Turkish straits, or Manchuria.

 

Intelligence Vessels

There are more than 200 intelligence vessels. This is a very large number but we must keep in mind the almost complete absence of ground stations, in con­trast to the United States, whose setup rests essentially on a network of ground bases. Most often these are only fishing vessels of about 500 t, simple information collectors. But there are also six Primorye of 4 500 t and one Balsam of 5 400 t, which are real floating laboratories, capable of processing the information gathered and conducting electronic war­fare. The navy furthermore has about 60 oceanographic and hydrographic vessels, which are exploring the ocean bottom not only for the needs of science or fishing but also in order better to determine the patrol areas for submarines. The naval air arm also contributes; it covers the maneuvers of Western navies and the tests of new vessels; on 27 January 1982, two Tupolev 95 based in Cuba were intercepted in the air space of the United States as they tried to approach the new aircraft carrier Vinson.

Information collection is not confined to military vessels only. The fishing fleet and the merchant navy are also involved. To give the reader an idea of the importance, which the navy assigns to intelligence that can be procured for it by "civilian" vessels, it suffices to say that the Soviet fishing fleet represents 40% of the world tonnage whereas it only comes up with 13% of the catch (9 million t out of a little more than 70 million) and the rather mediocre yield of the Soviet units is not sufficient to explain this superabun­dance; during the establishment of a Community fishing zone, the Soviets had to allow a drastic limitation of their catch in European waters; but they demanded and partially got a number of fishing vessels in an area much bigger than the one demanded by the allocated quotas. It is not difficult to guess why, especially when one runs into these fishing vessels in narrows or off Western submarine bases. Ever since the start of the 1960’s, permanent patrols by spy‑fishing‑vessels were thus established in all strategic places. Sea tests are constantly being followed and this has caused many incidents; the French nuclear missile subma­rine l’Indomptable had to interrupt a test cruise in 1976 because a fishing vessel, the Zond, was following it a little bit too closely; the first firing of the Trident missile was delayed for the same reason.

Every day, more than 150 Soviet merchant vessels put into Western ports. We are not astonished by their preference for military ports; until a ministerial decision barred their access in 1981, Soviet passenger vessels cruis­ing in the Mediterranean would each time stop at Toulon, a military port, rather than at Marseille, a civilian port. Col­liers, passing through the Strait of Gibraltar used the Spanish port of Ceuta in Morocco. Although it is quite suffi­cient for this type of shipping, it is not good enough for the Soviet government which demanded that Spain in 1978 grant facilities for its merchant vessels at Algesiras, a port which offers the tremendous advantage of permitting tighter surveillance of the naval base at Rota. Unfortu­nately for the Soviets, the Spanish government refused. To their intelligence‑gathering missions, these merchant ves­sels could possibly add sabotage or obstruction assignments since many ports could be blocked temporarily by one or two vessels sunk in the access channels. We must finally report the activity of scientific vessels chartered by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR: The Yuriy Gagarin and the Vladimir Komarov, the two biggest space observation vessels in the world, spend at least as much time tracking satellites and missile tests as studying the layers of the atmosphere.

It must be noted that this constant tie‑in between ci­vilian and military activities, so characteristic of the Soviet navy, is not a one way street: The fleet general staff on sev­eral occasions made vessels available to the Ministry of Fishing; two Whisky submarines were even refitted to search for fish. Several others participated in oceanographic programs organized by the Academy of Sciences. But the exact opposite of course is naturally true most often.

 

Naval Aviation

The naval air arm is essentially based ashore. The several tens of Hormone ASW helicopters on the Moskva and the Kiev vessels represent only a very modest potential; the Forger aircraft are incapable of measuring themselves against the fighter planes of the U.S. Navy. The 1 400 air­craft are broken down into two major categories: The ASMW aircraft and the bombers.

The ASW fight is handled by helicopters – about 300 – in coastal waters and, beyond that, by hydroplanes and patrol craft – about 150 – which remain within the limits of the close‑in approach zone.

The 750 bombers are charged with attacking enemy vessels as well as electronic warfare and reconnaissance. The [illegible number in Photostat] Badger and Blinder aircraft have a medium action radius (less than 5 000 km with in flight refueling); this seriously restricts their effec­tiveness; but the 250 Badger C and G already represent a terrible threat to fleets operating in European and Japa­nese waters with their AS5 and AS6 missiles that have a range of 100 nm. The Backfire B constitutes a similar threat with its AS4 that have a range of [illegible number in Photostat] nm, but this time on a worldwide scale. (The Backfire A is a strategic bomber. There was much talk about them during the final phase of SALT II.) Its action radius enables it to operate over all oceans, except the South Atlantic.

The South Atlantic can be covered from the Cuban and Angolan bases. Even if the Badger aircraft were to be retired faster than the Backfire aircraft are commissioned, at a ratio of 2:1, the Soviet naval air potential was danger­ously increased and the United States Defense Department report for FY 1981 is quite concerned about that: “The threat from the Backfire is becoming more dangerous than the threat from the Soviet attack submarines” [14]. The some­thing like 80 aircraft in service – the rate at which Backfire aircraft intended for the naval air arm are being built is about 15 per year – terribly complicate the defense of the Western squadrons and the danger may become even more acute with the appearance of a new bomber, the Blackjack, which is bigger than the B‑1 about which we still know very little; but it is expected to be commissioned by the begin­ning of the 1990’s and perhaps even at the end of this dec­ade. It is in effect probable that a naval version of this air­craft will be produced.

The navy finally has about 125 transport aircraft, which proved their effective­ness during the airlifts to An­gola and Ethiopia. These two demonstrations, as well as the recent boost in its potential following the introduction of the Backfire and shipboard aircraft, gave naval aviation a net prestige gain; its commander was made marshal and the writings of Admiral Gorshkov frequently underscore its importance.

The Soviet naval force as a whole is really impres­sive. With its submarines, its surface vessels, and its bomb­ers, it has a many-sided potential and is constantly being modernized; in 1970, only a quarter of the ships was equipped with missiles; today, more than half of the ships are equipped with missiles. But the armament is rather motley; for example, eight classes of cruisers and as many classes of destroyers are in service. As noted by George Connell: “This dispersion of effort is something very odd which one does not find in the West and it arouses specula­tions when it comes to understanding the rea­sons for that” [15].

 

Logic Behind Navy’s Development

Several factors may explain this diversity of units in the Soviet navy. The first one is technical: In contrast to the Americans, the Soviets rarely launch new‑design series. Most often, the new series are only extrapolations of earlier ones; for example, the Tango submarines are an improve­ment of the Foxtrot submarines which themselves are de­rived from the Zulu; the Kara cruisers are the synthesis of the Kresta cruisers which themselves sprang from the Kynda class; and the Krivak destroyers are extrapolations of the Kashin class. We thus have a continuous process of improvements expressed by the rapid succession of classes consisting of small numbers of ships; this reveals a lack of innovation capacity at the Soviet shipyards. This rule of course is not absolute; in 1962, the Kashin destroyers were the first warships to be powered exclusively by gas turbines (the Americans did not get to that point until 15 years later, with the Spruance class) and today the titanium subma­rines constitute a major technological breakthrough. But it is just the same surprising to find, to give just a single ex­ample, that we had to wait until 1980 to see the appearance of nuclear power in a surface combat vessel, although it could have been adopted without any major problems 20 years earlier (the atomic icebreaker Lenin dates back to 1957).

One might cite the Soviet system’s red tape [16], with du­plication of programs and efforts found not only in the navy; we can see this very clearly, for example, in the si­multaneous development of the SS16, 17, and 19, replacing the SS11. These factors undoubtedly played a role although a rather minor one. They do not enable us to understand fully the logic behind the fleet’s development. Michael Mac Gwire and, along with him, many other authors, especially Admiral Eberle [17] cast light on a very much more decisive factor: The diversity of vessels reflects the diversity of mis­sions assigned to the fleet, one after the other. It is this the­sis, which we must start with because it is the best‑known and it is therefore our guide here.

During the middle of the 1950’s, when Admiral Gorshkov replaced Admiral Kuznetsov at the head of the navy, the main naval threat against the Soviet Union was made up of the American aircraft carriers, which had nu­clear bombs on board. Gorshkov therefore undertook the construction of vessels equipped with ant surface missiles. This resulted in the Kynda cruisers, the Krupny destroyers, and the Long Bin submarines – the remodeled Whisky – as well as the Juliet and Echo I submarines, all of which carry SSN3. But, by the time they became operational at the be­ginning of the 1960’s, the threat had changed. After that it came from the Polaris submarines and the accent was now placed on ASW and the establishment of a force of similar missile‑firing submarines. The result, this time was the almost simultaneous appearance in 1967 of the strategic Yankee submarines, the submarine‑hunting Victor nuclear attack submarines, and the Moskva AS helicopter carriers. With the increase in the range of missiles, that forced the Soviet vessels to venture further, there was a need for a strong AA defense; certain destroyers of the Kotlin class were converted into AA ships and the Kresta and Kara cruisers received powerful AA armament. But with the commissioning of the Trident submarines, the Soviet ves­sels could no longer keep up with the American nuclear missile submarines in their coastal waters; regardless of their armament, they could not survive there. Admiral Gorshkov then turned to powerful surface combat vessels capable of going into action in remote areas, leading to the con­struction of the Kiev, the Kirov, and the Ivan Rogov. Having already been wrong twice, he has every chance – according to Admiral Eberle – to be wrong again this time [18].

The image we thus get is that “of Soviet efforts de­signed to develop a response to the West’s maritime capac­ity – continually countered by technological advances which made program after program obsolescent even before the units had been commissioned for active service. At the end of the 1950’x, all programs had been modified radically. The decisions made in 1954 and 1957‑1958 did not meet with any better fate and we have a picture of continuous cancel­lations, adaptations, and expedients” [19]. If we rea­lize that more than 75% of the ocean‑going fleet and more than 60% of the submarines came out during that period of fluctua­tions, we can easily under­stand that the Soviet fleet is not very homogeneous.

Before discussing the rationale behind the thesis presented by Michael Mac Gwire, we must state some res­ervations on the extension which Admiral Eberle provided for it: It is too early to say that the return to big surface vessels constitutes another mistake. The Kiev is a hybrid vessel and its VTOL aircraft have not yet been perfected; this much is certain; but the Soviets were not in a position, all at once, to build heavy aircraft carriers similar to those of the U.S. Navy. The Kirov, which, in the eyes of Western strategists, seems to revive the outmoded concept of the battle cruiser, is justified when one stops judging it in the light of Western criteria in order instead to try to consider it from the Soviet viewpoint; it is then explained very easily by the concern for giving it a strong survival capacity in a hostile environment which the Soviets are encountering on all oceans. Far from being absurd, it expresses the Soviet fleet’s determination to be able to operate in force far from its bases. On the other hand, one might recall that the U.S. Navy in the 1970’s submitted a similar project involving a 20 000 t strike cruiser which in the end was not built be­cause of opposition in Congress.

The objections to the scheme presented by Michael Mac Gwire are of two kinds. The first one consists in in­verting the hierarchy of factors: Contrary to current opin­ion, which maintains that Soviet naval programs are de­rived from a strategy that is determined a priori, “the Soviet government seems to have built the ships which it was tech­nically capable of building and it then came out in favor of the naval strategy suited for the ships which it had built” [20]. The second one denies the existence of a vast design aimed against the nuclear ballistic submarines. Far from mutually excluding each other, these two proposals complete each other [illegible word in Photostat]… the most consistent opponents of Michael Mac Gwire, Kenneth R. Mac Gruther and John E. Moore.

The former proposes an original interpretation for the development of the Soviet navy, which he himself de­scribes with modest terminology as “revolu­tionary in many ways” [21]. He starts with the ides that the navy managed to acquire its autonomy within the Soviet defense system and that its evolu­tion was guided only by the image which it had created of itself: Desiring to become a blue‑water fleet like the U.S. Navy, it used the anti‑nuclear-submarine ar­gument only to justify its constant demands for money and it christened its units starting in the 1960’s as antisubma­rine vessels only to deceive the political establishment which had assigned priority to its strategic functions. In reality, the hiatus “between the anti-surface 1950’s and the ASW 1960’s” does not exist; the Kresta II, the Kara, and the Krivak vessels are not new systems intended to cope with a new threat but the extension of the units of the 1950’s; in spite of their official ASW desti­nation, they are in fact mul­tipurpose vessels. There is thus a continuity in this evolu­tion which is explained both by the continued existence of the self‑image of the navy and the weight of the economic and technological demands. This strategy on the part of the navy wound up being supported by the political establish­ment in 1964‑1966 and continued during detente, with the appearance of the Kiev class once and for all documenting the blue­ water fleet status of the Soviet navy [22].

Less ambitious but also more skillful, John E. Moore proposes a simpler image. He, too, believes in the existence of a technological determinism, which he believes to be documented by “the basically parallel development lines of the U.S. Navy and the Soviet fleet” [23]. But he does introduce a nuance here and accepts a certain degree of voluntary action on the part of those involved: The hiatus of the 1960’s does exist but it is not explained by an anti‑nuclear‑submarine design whose existence is “in no way proven”; it is instead the result of a defensive concern; during the 1960’s, surface vessels were given the priority mission of guaranteeing – in case of tension or war – the access of the Yankee missile submarines and the attack submarines to the open oceans through the rather tight chokepoints which they must necessarily pass. In the 1970’s, there was added to this the need for protecting the Delta against the incursions of American submarines into Soviet waters [24].

Moore as a matter of fact differs from Mac Gwire on only one point: He assigns to the ASW reorientation of the 1960’s a defensive purpose (pro­tection of the Yankee and Delta and the attack submarines), whereas Mac Gwire explains this in terms of an offensive design (attack of the American nuclear ballistic submarines). They thus come up with the same criticism. Their explanations are monistic; they retain only one of the terms of the offensive / defensive alternative whereas, in fact, far from arguing with each other, they supplement each other perfectly: The obsession for protecting their sub­marines cannot be denied and did not prevent the Soviets from thinking in terms of hunting the Western nuclear ballistic submarines, an idea which we find everywhere in their writings and which is thus not a myth, even if its degree of practical implementation re­mains difficult to figure out

The challenge from Mac Gruther is more radical. But it is more ingenious than really convincing. First of all, because his foundations do not hold water. Let us skip over the fact that he is a little more contradictory in asserting simultaneously the navy’s autonomy and the weight of the economic requirements in its development. But this asser­tion as to the navy’s autonomy must be demonstrated. With good reason, Mac Gruther does not even try to do that: The indications running in the opposite direction are as a matter of fact numerous [25] and he himself gives an example of them in connection with the attack on the lines of com­munication [26]. Likewise, he does not tell us on what he bases his arguments in defining the Soviet fleet’s self‑image: That fleet gives the false impression of being only the transposi­tion of the image which the U.S. Navy (to which Mac Grutngher belongs) has made of it. Finally, he goes too far in denying the hiatus of the 1960’s: That the Kara, Kresta I, and Krivak vessels are not exclusively ASW we will gladly grant him; this reaction against the dominant monism rep­resented by Mac Gwire or Moore is a healthy thing. But that the main armament of these vessels should be the ASW SSN14 and not the surface‑to ­surface SSN16, as was believed initially, does have its consequences. These ex­treme statements furthermore are all the more regrettable as they are use­less since, in his conclusion, he presents a more classical table of the logic of the Soviet navy’s devel­opment: Initially, its priority mission was embarked on the way to becoming an ocean‑going and multipurpose blue‑water fleet [27]. Because he avoids the surrounding mo­nism, it is in the end he who presents the most likely image without having to resort to any false postulates. This is an image, which everybody can accept since Mac Gwire him­self, in spite of his anti‑SSBN obsession, underscores the turning point [28] represented by the 23^rd Congress of the CFSU, in 1966, where it was decided to use the fleet for political purposes [29].

This brings us to the significant question of the role played by Admiral Gorshkov. There are two opposing im­ages here. The most widespread one makes him the main architect of Soviet naval expansion. Admiral Zumwalt sees in him “the most effective commander of contemporary na­vies” and hails his “strategic genius” [30]. The dust jacket on the English­ language translation of his book: The Maritime Power of the State, describes him as “the creator of the mo­dem Soviet navy, the most brilliant Russian naval strategist of all times”. But Michael Mac Gwire opposes this stereo­typed image with the image of a navy boss incapable of im­posing his views upon the political establishment which in reality only decided to re­orient Soviet naval policy, with Gorshkov only following with some delay; in short, “he is certainly no Jackie Fischer” [31]. Admiral Eberle grants that he played a bigger role in the development of the fleet but he does so only in order to note that he was always wrong. He furthermore credits him with mistakes in the tactical employment of ships: The failure to assign the Kara vessels to protect the Kiev ships or the Berezina supply ships in support of the major units and he concludes: “I am forced to conclude that Gorshkov’s skill did not reside in the estab­lishment of a master plan for Soviet naval development but in the procurement of sufficient resources to enable him to satisfy all the inevitable internal pressure groups that exist in as large an organization as the Soviet navy. Gorshkov was able to satisfy all but he did so at a very high price and sometimes to the detriment of the other services. This is the mark of an easy political opportunism” [32].

The two images are irreconcilable. Let us leave aside the problem of his strategic writings, noting just the same that the attention that has been devoted to them is to a good extent due to the fact that their author happens to be the commander‑in‑chief of the Soviet fleet. If there is one book that must remain in the history of naval strategy, that would most certainly be Reflections on Tactics by Admiral Makarov – which his adversary, Admiral Togo, had translated into Japanese – rather than “The Maritime Power of the State”. The real problem is the problem of the part Gorshkov played in the fleet’s growth. The position of Admiral Zumwalt – which may surprise us at first sight – as a matter of fact is perfectly logical: At the risk of credit­ing this magnificent success – and let us not forget that Zumwalt is a maximalist – to the Soviet system, which a good American could not really do, we must credit it to an exceptional man and naturally a sailor rather than to the political establishment in order to persuade the American politicians, by force of example, not to stick their noses into the navy’s business. Unfortunately, his thesis ran into a big obstacle: Gorshkov is not behind the establishment of an ocean‑going fleet. John Moore remarked that all programs which would give the Soviet navy a new face had already been launched when Gorshkov took over:

a)        A family of antisurface weapons (SSN1, 2, and 3) was practically ready or commissioning;

b)        New propulsion methods (nuclear and gas turbine) were being developed (the first nuclear submarine of the No­vember class was to be launched in 1958);

c)        The first submarine equipped with ballistic missiles was launched in September 1955;

d)        The long‑range Bear bomber, the Bison, and the Badger appeared during the 2 years before he took over;

e)        The hydrofoil Madge was seen for the first time in 1954;

f)         The Hen helicopter was developed in 1955‑1956 [33].

It is therefore difficult to claim that the initiative for change over the past 25 years came from Admiral Gorshkov who in fact only continued a road opened under his predecessor Kuznetsov. Nor could one without hesita­tion credit him with a first‑ranking role in moving beyond the traditional coastal strategy. It was as a matter of fact not until 1963, in other words, 7 years after he became commander‑in‑chief and 2 years after the decision as to the forward deployment, that the first article, signed by him, came out in favor of such a reorientation [34]. The initiative seems to have come from the political establishment. Mac Gwire’s thesis is thus correct but, once again, only for the 1960’s. After that it becomes more doubtful. There is no consensus in favor of the fleet within Soviet leading circles and Gorshkov had to go out in support of the principle of a balanced fleet, as witnessed by his articles that were pub­lished in Morskoi Sbornik in 1972; the anomalies of their publica­tion, as revealed by Robert Weinland [35], point up the resistance encountered within the military establishment by these pleas in favor of a navy that would pursue its own strategy beyond the traditional limits of the Soviet conti­nental bloc. Michael Mac Gwire himself furthermore noted that these anomalies ended at the moment a series of arti­cles on the defense of socialism, published by the armed forces daily, was abruptly cancelled; those articles con­tained indirect criticisms of the articles written by Gorshkov [36]. The last book by him ­The Maritime Power of the State – has the same nature of a plea and seeks to dem­onstrate that “all big contemporary powers are maritime states” [37] and discretely to correct history in order to bring out a participation in the “great fatherland war”, a constant reference used by Soviet military personnel, which was supposedly much more glorious than it had been in reality. Even if there were to be any doubt as to his initial attitude, it is certain that Admiral Gorshkov thereafter powerfully contributed to the continuation of the effort undertaken in his capacity as fleet commander, of course, but also as a propagandist of maritime power in dealing with the politi­cal establishment; he thus indeed comes out looking like the chief architect of Soviet naval expansion.

He thus did play an active role. But is this role posi­tive, as maintained by Zumwalt or negative, as Eberle thinks? The answer obviously depends on our judgment of the Soviet navy’s capacities: Zumwalt overestimates them just as much as Eberle looks upon them with skepticism. But the question is a tough one and, in the final analysis, it is quite secondary: Just as Gorshkov can­not claim credit for the rise in Soviet maritime power all by himself, so could one not completely blame him for the weak points affecting its capability. They come essentialy from struc­tural facts over which even the fleet’s commander has no control.

 

The Navy’s Weak Points

The establishment of a fleet is a difficult and long‑range undertaking. The equipment and manpower problems exist always but they emerge with particular seri­ousness in a navy, which does not have a long experience behind it. More­over, the geopolitical situation of the USSR makes the problem of logistic support and bases particu­larly crucial.

 

Materiel

The first ships built after the war were based on a defective design: The Sverdlov cruisers, for example, were too big for the Baltic and insufficiently equipped for the open ocean. But as the series continued, Soviet naval ship­building improved and the latest models, for example, the Kara or the Krivak or the Charlie and Alfa submarines can rival the best Western products [38]; they are fast, they have endurance, and they are very well armed. But, in the face of their American rivals, they still suffer from serious short­comings.

The first of these have to do with their design. They have the defects de­riving from their qualities: Their fast speed brings about a very high sound level which, first of all, is a very serious handicap for the submarines but which also generally besets the surface vessels. Their impressive armament does give them a fire power very much superior to that of their Western counter­parts but has several bad consequences: The room taken up by all of these weapons is to the detriment of the quarters reserved for the crew – al­though this does not bother the Soviets very much – and this applies above all to the fuel tanks, thus necessitating frequent resupply at sea and at a slow cruising speed of something like 12 kn (and that already was the speed of the Baltic Squadron on the way to Tsushima in 1904) whereas the ships of the US. Navy rare1y sail at less than 15 kn. Here is another consequence which is the most serious and the most immediate one; the presence of all of these weap­ons creates a terrible vulnerability: All it takes is for one missile hit and everything else goes up in flames [39].

It is furthermore not at all certain that this heavy arsenal offers maximum effectiveness. One might instead ask oneself whether the abundance of fire power is not de­signed to make up for its inaccuracy which is due to the deficiencies in the electronic equipment and to the vulner­ability of the missiles that fly high and can be destroyed by AA defenses, as demonstrated by the Yom Kippur War. The diversity of weapon systems – for example, for ASW action, a Krivak carries missiles, torpedoes, and rockets – and the diversity of detection systems – a Krivak has 12 radars, whereas an American Spruance ­class destroyer, although twice as big, has only four – shows that the Soviets are re­luctant to fall back on a single equipment item and that in turn casts doubt on their real degree of reliability: That level should certainly be below their theoretical level. The Achilles heel represented by submarine detection has al­ready been mentioned; although medium‑frequency and low ­frequency sonars have become quite common and although the most recent ships are equipped with towed sonars, their performances continue to be consider­ably inferior to those of Western equipment. It does not seem, for example, that they could detect a periscope or a schnorkel. The vessels so far have not had any tactical data processing system along the lines of the American NTDS or the French Senit – a first generation which should be relatively rudimentary, appeared on the Kiev and the most recent cruisers – and the Soviets did not succeed in combining their weapons into integrated AA, ASW, or anti-surface systems because of their delay in the data processing field, a situation which does not seem to be developing any better in the near fu­ture. Finally, the rather poor employment of shipboard heli­copters and the inadequacy of information furnished by their satellites seriously restrict the long‑range combat ca­pabilities while the absence or weakness of missile ­launch reloading possibilities on most of the units seriously dimin­ishes their operational capacity after the first salvoes.

Another apparently minor deficiency however turns out to be of the utmost importance: Soviet vessels are de­signed for cold seas. The episode of the snowplows that were sent to Guinea is famous now but one forgets too often that dispatching a ship designed for the Arctic to tropical waters creates considerable problems: The crew suffers ter­ribly due to the absence of air conditioning and the equip­ment undergoes very rapid deterioration. These phenomena are made even more preoccupying by the weakness of the network of bases and overseas facilities, which prevents any stopovers and regular careening.

We must finally note that the absence of any spare space makes all moderniza­tion problematical, except for a complete remodeling job, whereas the Americans, from the start of construction on, make allowance for further mod­ernization and provide the necessary room. Soviet vessels are thus built for the short run, in line with the threat and the resources of the moment without excessive attention being paid to their further evolution. This detail, which has been rather unimportant until now, will soon turn out to be of the utmost importance. The stereotyped image of a Soviet navy, which is supposed to be first‑ranking because its ships are so young, as a matter of fact is becoming less and less true: Johan Holst noted starting in 1975 that the av­erage age of the American and Soviet vessels was balanced out for most of the categories [40].

Table IV

Source: Johan J. Holst, "The navies of superpowers: motives, forces and prospects," in Power at sea II, Super­powers and navies, Adelphi Papers, n° 123.

 

Since then, this tendency has only been confirmed further and it is becoming more accentuated; the Soviets will soon be facing a serious dilemma: They will either see an increase in the number of obsolescent ships or they will have to devote a large portion of the activities at the naval shipyards to their modernization, of course to the detriment of new construction. Jean Labayle‑Couhat remarked that half of the ships of more than 2 000 t – which are the only ones capable of operating on the high seas – are more than 20 years old [41], whereas naval shipbuilding has leveled off at around 300 000 t per year due to the crowding of the ship­yards. But, once again, one must not concentrate on the number of ships; the units that appear currently are more high‑performance than those they replace and we have for some time now been a watching an acceleration in the rate of appearance of new equipment; since 1980, we have thus identified two new anti surface systems (the SSN19 on the Kirov class vessels, the SSN22 on the Sovremenniy and on the Tarantul II), four AA systems (the SAN6 on the Kirov, and the SAN7 on the Sovremenniy, the SAN8 on the Udaloy and a laser weapon on the second Kirov) plus an ASW sys­tem (the SUWN1 on the Kirov). They are also bigger and we will thus simultaneously see – if the current trend contin­ues – a drop in the number of ships and an increase in the total tonnage. The following table is an estimate of the status of the Soviet fleet in 1990 and in 2000 with the growth rate of ship­yard output being 3,4 or 5%.

 

Table V

Around 1990	3%	4%	5%	1979
Combat fleet tonnage (in millions)	3.3	3.5	3.7	[illegible]
Major fighting ships	<