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Revitalizing the United Nations Anticipation and Prevention As Primary Goals
Doctor in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Paris II-Panthéon-Assas (Centre Thucydide)
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In tackling the on-going topic of UN reform, one should be honest with the analysis of the problems at stakes. It is necessary to first take into account the profound changes that have occurred since the end of the Cold War, as well as acknowledging the limits of an international organization and the shape of the UN system. It is only from that analysis that proposals can be made to rationalize and to make more efficient the functioning of the United Nations. What the Organization needs is not only a rationalization, it primarily needs a vision that gives it purpose and meaning. This article proposes that its primary goals should be anticipation and prevention – it should be the advanced guard and the conscience of the world. In this context, the United Nations is an indispensable and priceless instrument in international relations. The dramatic changes in international relations which have been occurring since the mid-1980s have placed the issue of the United Nations reform at the center of the international agenda. How should it adapt to a new international context characterized by globalization and fragmentation? One has the strong feeling that the Organization has not anticipated or even accompanied, in its structures or in its working methods, the evolution of the international system. It seems to have satisfied itself with following and implementing the agenda which prevailed at the time of the Cold War. The massive and sometimes excessive recourse to expensive peace-keeping operations without appropriate political strategy and means strengthened the critics of the system which stands accused of giving the same answers to problems that have changed both in their nature and origins. The fiftieth Anniversary of the Organization constituted an ideal window of opportunity to, in the words of former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, effect the transition from "the old to the new UN". However, Member States missed, during the autumn of 1995, the opportunity to discuss in a serious and determined manner the issue of reform, and to set up a precise agenda for its implementation. A ‘High-Level Open-ended Working Group on the Strengthening of the United Nations’ (also called ‘Essy Group’, from the name of the President of the General Assembly who recommended its creation and who chaired it)1 was established, but it has mostly dealt with organizational proposals.2 The material was not lacking though, since 1994-1995 saw the publication of several major reports on the future of the UN from independent groups.3 Paradoxically, however, it was after the fiftieth UN anniversary that reform aroused a renewal of interest among Member States. In 1996, the United States took the lead4, and UN reform constituted an important issue during the American presidential election. The importance of reform was further dramatized when it was placed for the second time on the agenda of the G7 Summit held in Lyons, France, in June 1996.5 In 1997, the newly elected Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, set up, despite a harsh political context and American financial pressures6, a precise timetable for the implementation of reforms.7 However, these reforms were once again mostly administrative, mainly concerning the structure of the UN Secretariat; they were not driven by a clear objective on what the role of the United Nations should be in the future.
At the dawn of the 21st century, it is time to tackle this issue head on. The "Millenium Summit (which will be held between September 6th and 11th, 2000, at the level of Heads of State and Government, and which main theme will be "The UN in the 21st Century") gives to Member States a second chance to think about perspectives for the UN system. At stake is not only the future of the Organization, but, some even say, its very existence. The "Millenium Summit" will have to tackle with fundamental questions:
In other words, how can the Organization adapt itself to the evolution of the international system in order to "give the 21st century a well-equipped, financed and structured UN that would efficiently serve the peoples it was created for"?8 These questions deal above all with the preparation of the 21st century in order "to better manage the unpredictable"9, and with the principles, goals and future of the UN system as a whole. This is not primarily a matter of day-to-day adaptation and management. Rather, it is a matter of anticipation and vision which must aim at establishing a system which is really in tune with tomorrow’s challenges.10
A PRIORITY : ANTICIPATE TO ADAPT
An effective reform of the United Nations requires a thorough analysis of its international context. It cannot avoid a prospective reflection and effort: ‘re-thinking’ the post-Cold War period is therefore the main priority. Indeed, no international political conference had been organized in order to deal with the changes that occurred between 1989 and 1992, as was done after World War I and II. This is despite profound changes generated by the fall of the Berlin Wall and of the ‘Iron Curtain’, the dismemberment of the Soviet empire, and the speeding up of globalization, which together have brought changes as profound and important as those generated by the two world wars. The changes include:
These are key phenomena that the UN must integrate in its thinking and decisions, because, as the current Secretary-General puts it: "to stand still while the world moves forward is to slide helplessly backward".13 Theses changes have led to a complete metamorphosis of the whole international system, which is less and less interstate and more and more transnational. Its center of gravity has moved slowly from Europe to the Asian-Pacific. Financial and economic power, and the power of influence seem to have replaced the political and command powers. The current international system is not regulated by a balance of power anymore, because American influence and power do not have any counter-balance. According to some observers, the United States thus exerts an ‘authoritarian multilateralism’14 or a ‘new unilateralism’15 which allows it to manage world affairs according to its exclusive interests, agenda and objectives, and to base its action within the international system on an instrumental conception of the UN, a policy that is provoking the bitterness of many actors that refuse this domination. Because of the rapid growth of interdependencies and means of communication, world problems now constitute a shared issue which cannot be reduced to a single cause or to a monolithic perception. These problems do not necessarily require a global solution; the most important is to find, as Zaki Laïdi put it, "a relevant level of decision and action".16 As Béatrice Pouligny underlines, "the future will probably give less space to gigantic projects, but more to human-scale adjustments, which will give individuals the opportunity to grasp a bit of this universe that overwhelms them".17 Finally, the post-Cold War international system is characterized by the disappearance of the ‘threat’, of the logic of adversity, as well as by an "empty system of reference"18, the loss of meaning19; it is a system in which ‘small ideologies’ (individualism, narcissism, concern for oneself) have replaced ‘great ideologies’ carrying project, hopes and alternatives.20 One could say that there exists a loss of meaning and a lack of a federative project on the global scale; instead, numerous ‘micro-meanings’ exist that induce "the spreading of a mosaic of (neither accepted nor unifying) ‘codes’ and ‘rules’ that nobody will respect". This trend is a consequence of the fragmentation of the world that leads to an "increasing atomization of the society" and that gives greater place to "individual dynamics rather than to collective situations".21 These phenomena that generated an increasing complexity reflect what several authors have called a ‘crisis of civilization’. This crisis would have three different aspects: the nation-state crisis, the societal crisis (which is also the crisis of communication and intelligibility), and the crisis of the human being.22
The UN thus now faces a series of problems that have not been foreseen by the drafters of the UN Charter. As Richard J. Poncio said, "the words ‘population’, ‘migration’, ‘famine’, ‘poverty’ and ‘environment’ do not appear in the 1945 Charter"23, nor the word ‘development’, even though the Charter already mentions the need "to promote social progress"24, and creates an Economic and Social Council. Since 1945, preoccupations and problems have naturally changed, and the UN must be able to go with these evolutions in the three areas (political, economic, and social) with which the Charter deals. As Ghassan Salamé said, "diplomats, researchers, and strategists must from now on analyze a long list of concrete situations in which the question is not to find ‘Moscow’s hand’ or ‘CIA’s agents’, but rather to understand societies in decay, breaking up of territories, and failed States".25 The challenge to meet at the present time and for the future is: "to grasp the multidimensionality of realities"26 and to gain "the intelligibility of complex situations"27. To accomplish that, one must avoid partitioning solutions given to specific problems or restricting them to a single area. Indeed, a problem cannot be tackled only at the political level, because the political, economic and social spheres are closely interrelated. On the contrary, "in order to understand the phenomenon, one must question the causes as well as the interconnections between the different actors that are politics, war, law, economy, culture, moral... and to embrace the whole with a single and simple look".28 This would be particularly useful in order to better understand the intrastate nature of most current conflicts and the root causes.
The 1945 Charter failed to forecast the problem of intrastate or infrastate conflicts. During 40 years, these conflicts have been turned into East-West confrontations and into ideological wars, the settlement of which came up against the too well-known Article 2(7) of the Charter that says: "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter". The current prevalence of intrastate or civil wars goes along forms of diffuse violence – militia proliferation (leading to the privatization of violence), criminalization of politics, slaughter of civilians, terrorism, genocide29 –, that throw all analytical schemes and interstate relations into confusion. These ‘decomposing’, ‘degenerated’, or ‘anarchical’ conflicts have no rules anymore, but are rather taking the shape of spreading violence. This violence, even if it occurs within a country, does not concern only that country, but calls the attention of the world as a whole. They question the relationship between national sovereignty and the respect of human rights. The ‘humanitarian intervention’ led by NATO in Kosovo seemed to undermine the sacrosanct principle of national sovereignty. However, the criteria adopted for intervention are not applied to every conflict or crisis in the world. And the ‘international community’ is, as in East Timor, still intervening too late, after massacres have occurred. The reluctance to intervene is due to States’ narrow conception of sovereignty, and to the fact that its contents has remained the same since the end of World War II, although the notion itself has evolved. The alteration of this concept occurred because state sovereignty is today questioned by numerous actors (supranational, transnational, or sub-national ones) and forces (economic, commercial, technological, and cultural ones). Moreover States are more and more challenged by the increasing role of individuals. As Samuel A. Makinda pointed out, the idea of sovereignty does no longer refer to State sovereignty but also to popular sovereignty30, as well as international security goes hand in hand with ‘human security’. Indeed, for several years now, the Security Council has taken into account the extension of the notion of international security by recognizing that "non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security".31 This is, however, not yet systematic but rather occurs on a day-to-day basis, and is still to much conditioned by the contradictory interests of the Security Council permanent members or of the regional groups. However, "excessive flexibility, indifference to categorization and a ‘pragmatic’ case by case approach can lead to ‘operational uncertainty’ and non-compliance"32, and therefore a departure from the principles on which the UN is based. This leads us to question the initial objectives of the Charter: do they aim the protection of States or the protection of their citizens?33 Even more important is that a lack of strictness regarding the treatment of these changes can make people think that the UN acts according to the principle of double standards. Thus, "by dint of being too selective in the choice of its missions, the Security Council might become – if it is not already – an interstitial organ that deals with world gaps considered as minor by great powers".34 Here again, Security Council decisions only reflect the will or the lack of will, the interests or the lack of interests of its Member States, instead of reflecting those of an organ of concertation created for the implementation of cooperative policies in favor of the common benefit.
The effective exercise of popular sovereignty at the international level – multilateral or even regional – requires the building of an ‘international civil society’ better organized and structured than the one it currently exists. An embryo of international civil society has emerged during the major UN conferences (especially during the City Summit in Istanbul35), to which NGOs participated, as well as several associations, the private sector, representatives of local communities, scientific communities and experts. This will occur again in May 200 with the ‘Millenium Forum’ that will bring together all NGOs representatives and other civil society groups who will draw proposals for the ‘Millenium Summit’ and try to create an organizational structure whereby peoples of the world can participate effectively in global decision-making. The recent World Trade Organization conference has showed the powers of a potential organized international civil society. However, until now, these seeds of international civil society are far from being able to efficiently and constantly weigh up States decisions and actions. The problem is that the integration of non-state actors remains imperfect, uneven, and in submission to states’ good will, especially in its major organs.36 Nevertheless, little by little, the participation of actors of the civil society to the debates and work of the United Nations can help to contain the power of some major states, and to reduce tensions between universality and national sovereignty. This would be also true for the role of small States. For example, are the provisions of Articles 31 and 32 – regarding the participation of non members States of the Security Council to its debates – always respected? Even if this participation is real, do the ideas submitted by those States have a real influence on ‘pre-decisions’ taken most of the time behind closed doors by the permanent members? In this case, as in many others, the strict enforcement of the Charter articles would already be a serious improvement, and would diminish the instrumental approach used by major powers towards the UN.
These international changes generate tensions which are difficult to manage. They also constitute key challenges to meet at the dawn of the 21st century. They also bring out the diversity of forces and actors involved at the international level and the structural paradoxes they infer. Tensions exist between the transnational and the interstate level; between sovereignty and interference; between contradictory interests; between the slowness of States and the rapidity of the other actors; between practicality, and vision and hopes; between strength and power on the one hand, justice and equality on the other hand; between universality and individualism or particularisms; and between intervention, neutrality, and impartiality.37 It is within this context of tensions and adaptation that the role and the usefulness of the United Nations is questioned. The world Organization should be able to facilitate this adaptation by exerting its mediatory and regulatory role, and by providing a link between all the actors of the international system. It should stimulate a ‘social mediation’ that expresses the ‘universal Us’ and "dissolves the ‘I’ at the international scale".38 The reform of the World Organization therefore requires both a structural adaptation that gives a wider efficiency and a better rationality, and a conceptual adaptation that provides a meaning to a collective project.
A STRUCTURAL REFORM
Since the early days, three major trends of thought have prevailed: a reformist trend that wishes a ‘revitalization’, a ‘rationalization’ of the Organization within the framework of the Charter; a more hostile trend that wishes a UN reduced to the bare minimum (trend that is nowadays represented by the anti-UN side of the US Republican Party, and in particular the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission, Senator Jesse Helms39); a radical trend that advocates the replacement of the current UN by a ‘Third Generation Organization’ (argument supported by Maurice Bertrand40). These trends have various impact, but all question the problem of the adaptation of the Organization to new global challenges and international context at the dawn of the 21st century. How can the UN adjust in order not to look as an organization of the past, in order to be in line with the aspirations of the populations of this world, and with the possibilities of action? The answer to those questions must be accorded with the knowledge and a realistic vision of the nature and the achievements of the UN system. To the critical-minded people who think the UN is useless, let us remind them that the Organization has accomplished a great deal. It is sufficient to mention its action in favor of the extension of international law, the delegitimization of war between States, of better interstate relationships through multilateral diplomacy, and its records regarding the rights of the poorest and human rights in general (understood in their broad meaning: the promotion of children; women, minorities, indigenous, and refugees rights). Clearly the Organization cannot be responsible for the indecision of its Member States, their lack of political will or their mistakes. Let us also be remember that the UN is not an independent or autonomous actor of international relations on the same level as States: the supranationality it claims or that it is allocated remains in fact theoretical.41 The United Nations is not a world government, but only a system of cooperation between States. It is an intergovernmental organization whose decision-making power lies in the hands of its Member States, and mostly in the hands of its most powerful ones. Therefore the Organization does not have any financial resources of its own, but a budget composed by the contributions of its Member States, and the head of the Organization, the Secretary-General, is nominated by the Security Council and then appointed by the General Assembly. Ghassan Salamé summarizes bluntly and exactly the situation: "the UN is the States’ daughter, but a unbeloved one. Provided with instruments for action, it is not thought to deserve to use them. It is entrusted to maintain peace, but it must act within the strict observance of ‘national competence’ of its Member States. It is accused of being passive, inefficient, or counter-productive, but it is deprived of financial means in order to fulfill its mission. Worse: major powers consider it as being universal, but forbid to deal with problems that concern them closely and that are threatening international security. That is why the critics towards the UN do not ring true ... : they come less under an objective statement than under the indictment of an organ that do not want – or cannot – accomplish the primary task that the powerful assigned to it: to hide the hesitations, the contradictions or simply the cowardice of governments".42 One must distinguish the nature of the Organization from its functions. The functions of the Organization can sometimes lead it to appear to be more than the simple addition of its national components, and to play ‘semi-autonomous’ role. This depends on the field in which it operates and the interests it disturbs. The UN is thus by turns a ‘global manager’ and a ‘global counsel’.43 States add to these functions from time to time: an instrument of foreign policy, a negotiating forum, a scapegoat, an organ of legitimization. But, in any case, the Organization has only a relative independence which is limited by States’ sovereignty and national interests. Decisions, actions or inertia of the Organization are the results of power struggle and conflicts of interests taking shape within the international system that are reproduced within the Organization. This partly explains the slowness of a reform process that has to take into account the opinion, interests and proposals of all the Member States (189) and regional groupings.44
The reformist trend currently prevails: due to their radicality the two other trends would imply too important transformations. There would, in theory, exist a fourth trend supported by some NGOs: the one in favor of the effective supranationality of the United Nations. But States are not yet ready to tolerate the existence of a genuine supranational actor that would limit in a more open and efficient way their power and freedom of decision. Dynamics of change does not necessarily imply a revolutionary process, but can evolve through an evolutionary and adaptive one.45 Therefore, to the question of adaptation of the Organization to its environment, Members States have clearly answered by the will to rationalize the Organization, to renovate it without changing its foundations. Thus, without being able to achieve a real consensus on the future of the United Nations and on the way to conceive the role of an international organization, States have, for two years now, settled a number of priorities that should inspire the reform process. This process should mainly consist in a ‘cleaning up’ of the system, centered on the identification of its comparative advantages, a better inter-agency coordination, and the will to do better with less.
According to G7 Member States, the UN must, in order to be more efficient, "clarify its role and its comparative advantages. It must enhance the efficiency of its Secretariat and operational framework, make them more coherent and ensure genuine coordination at all levels".46 They also expected that the UN would concentrate on its development activities. Does this mean that they want it to gradually relativize the peace-keeping and enforcement parts of its job that more directly concern States’ national security interests and sovereignty? Indeed, the UN has since 1995 become an Organization that maintains order, rather than maintains peace. Most recent ‘peacekeeping operations’ were in fact police missions or administrative ones that rebuild the administrative structures of a State. After the UN failures in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda (‘failures’ that were mainly due to the lack of political will and strategy of major UN Member States), States does not trust the UN anymore and prefer acting through multinational coalitions or regional organization. G7 Member States had thus underlined "UN’s priority areas": "reduction of poverty, employment, housing, the provision of essential services, especially those relating to health and education, the advancement of women and protection of children, and humanitarian assistance in general".47
In times of financial crisis and budgetary restrictions, States want the UN to do better with less. This means downsizing, to remedy competence overlapping and duplication, to eliminate or to "merge" some funds and programs that are redundant among themselves or with the specialized agencies.48 Here the role and competence of specialized agencies seem to be recognized. It is indeed indispensable that the different specialized agencies of the system regain their full authority opposite to the funds and programs that encroach most of the time on their competence, which lead to artificially hypertrophy the whole UN system. Nevertheless, the role of the specialized agencies is, since the G8 Summit in Denver, more or less questioned by the call for a "thorough and urgent review of the UN’s funds and programs, as well as a system-wide review of the roles and mandates of specialized agencies and commissions". The Secretary-General answered this call in July 1997 by recommending the establishment of a ‘Special Commission’ for this purpose. The problem is that States did not specify the direction that this "review" should take: a recentralization of the system under the UNDP and the Bretton Woods institution aegis, or a division of labor and a real distribution of tasks?49 But to be really efficient and complete, this reform should also concern the Bretton Woods institutions who should focus their work on the financial aspects of the development aid50, and stop encroaching on the fields of substance of the specialized institutions of the UN system. A real and efficient mechanism of coordination should harmonize the activities of all the components of the UN system by avoiding these institutions adopt contradictory policies or programs as was done in the past51. This would imply a radical change in the structures of the system and innovations regarding the relationships between the different agencies. This is particularly true if, with James Paul, we consider that these drawbacks of the UN system result "from deep political disagreements among its members and between other contending forces".52 However, this coordination can only succeed if a coordination exists at the state level, because a ‘micro-coordination’ cannot have any effect if a grand scale coordination and a consensus on the objectives to pursue does not exist. This coordination must take place upstream, before the decision-making, and at three different levels: between States, between States and the institutions of the system, and within States, between their different governmental bodies.
Finally, a particular emphasis is put on the financial reform, on the way to modify states’ contributions and to reduce the UN budget. Serious cuts have already been made in most agencies, funds and programs of the UN system (especially at the UNCTAD and UNIDO). Since 1995, the UN budget is regularly cut down. In fact, a true financial reform come up against the contradiction that exists between the will to pay less and the will to keep a control on the Organization. Some countries complain that their contribution is too high. But are these same countries ready to accept a diminution of their power of control and of political pressure? This is the exact situation of the United States today. The alleged disproportionate contribution to the UN budget (25% for the ordinary budget, 31% the peace-keeping le budget) gives them an extraordinary power of control on the whole Organization. Would the United States really accept to renounce some of this power to the benefit of States that would be more favorable to the reinforcement of the role of the United Nations? I doubt it. Perhaps it is for the same reason that the proposals aiming at providing the Organization with independent financial resources53 have been kept off the negotiating agenda. The non-payment of contributions is entirely a political problem, not a financial one. Compare to the budget of a major power, the UN budget ($1,3 billion for the ordinary budget, and $3 billion for the peacekeeping budget) is indeed ridiculously low. The peace-keeping budget represents 1,1% of the US military budget, which is the equivalent of two days of the "Desert Storm" operation. The UN ordinary budget represents about 4% of the annual budget of a town like New York.54 The current US contribution to the UN ordinary budget costs each American $1,2 per year, and the peacekeeping budget about $7. However, perhaps more meaningful is the $5 billion spent by the UN system in the economic and social field, which is equivalent to 88 cents spent for each inhabitant of this planet; although at the same time States are spending about $767 billion per year in military material, which is equivalent to $134 per inhabitant55. This is much more than, according to Wally N’Dow, the Secretary-General of the City Summit in Istanbul, what is needed (less than $100 per person) to "put a roof over the head and bring safe water and sanitation, to every man, woman and child on this planet".56 These micro reforms are without any doubt very useful, because they would allow the extremely decentralized UN system to become a more ‘compact’, more rational system with clearer lines of authority. They would also make a better well-balanced system between its components. But here, as in anywhere else, States still have to prove their determination and good will to implement those proposals that need some changes of behavior and that call into question some interests. The several working groups still have not reached a consensus on concrete proposals, and on precise timetable and measures. However, even if these proposals are justified, they cannot constitute a real project for the future and are not sufficient. One-off or organizational reforms will never replace thorough ones that combine vision and project, or long-term strategy, in order to restore the credibility of UN actions and decisions. One should not only ask the question ‘how’, but also the question ‘what to do’ and ‘which missions for the UN’. TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL REFORM
It seems more and more that, in order to be efficient and credible, the UN must focus on what it does best and can actually do, which means that it should make the most of the interstice left by its Member States.57 It is indeed "within the interstices of the interstate, dominated, as ever, by inequities and rivalries, that elements of universal, or at least universalistic, awareness, competence and solidarity are timidly dawning".58 The UN must today regain a coherent and coordinated action, method of functioning and a leadership, that would have anticipation and prevention as a common denominator. The main reason is that the UN cannot anymore expect to replace the action of States. On the other hand, it cannot only be just a stopgap measure. Without a true operational concept to lead enforcement actions, the UN cannot be credible on a theater of operations. Without any means, without a single and unified command, and without clear and precise mandates, the UN cannot pretend to make war instead of States. Either peacekeeping must therefore go back to what is was originally and not turn into enforcement anymore; or States must provide the Security Council with a true military capacity and tool such as a small rapid reaction force that would intervene in a preventive manner. The Security Council Member States must decide what they want. Purely military action is less and less relevant to solve current world problems where "international stability and security transcend ... the military sphere". I should rather rely upon "a whole set of economic, financial, political, educational, scientific and technological measures that need to be worked out in concerted manner and applied in good time".59 In the perspective of the wholehearted application of the Charter principles, the United Nations should constitute a permanent framework to better manage the economic advantages of globalization, to mitigate its disadvantages, to "spread the benefits of economic growth"60, to coordinate the forces of a nascent ‘civil society’ at the international level, to be the guarantor of the world heritage and of the world’s cultural diversities, and to foster sustained and sustainable human development. Three directions for a reform of the United Nations are here proposed, so that the Organization accompanies international evolutions; so that instead of reacting, it acts.
A Reinforced Action
The action of the UN should be governed by the following triptych: sustainable development / prevention / culture of peace. This triptych should be inserted into a broad conception of international security and into a long-term outlook. As Boutros Boutros-Ghali said, the UN must develop "a preventive action to better control the present, and a prospective action to better take on the future".61
Development is the most secure basis for peace; it is also "the most important task that mankind is facing today".62 Sustainable development is "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs".63 This development should first be centered on the human being. It must also respect the environment, and be recognized as a fundamental human right. Therefore it should be assured by a broader intellectual understanding, of a deeper moral commitment, and of more efficient political measures. Governments of the wealthiest countries are discovering that the ‘all-economic’ is not the solution64 and that some efforts should be made for the poor countries, as well as the poorest regions or social classes within a country. The G8 Summit at Cologne expressed the will to "deepen the development partnership" between developing countries, developed countries and multilateral institutions, that would aim at sustainable development and the eradication of poverty, and that would be based on the spirit of solidarity, because "peace at home ... necessitates peace abroad and cooperation among nations".65 However, much has still to be done so that the public development aid of industrialized countries reaches 0,7% of their GNP.66 One must strongly emphasize on the fact that a developed economy gives more advantages and benefits in case of a partnership, of commercial relationships and economic (and thus political) stability than does a developing economy. Public aid for development cannot be entirely replaced by private investment that is too selective and too demanding. In addition, development does not only mean a better economic and technological competitiveness, but also and mostly a better well-being for populations, e.g., better living conditions, education, sanitary conditions, and a greater respect for the environment. Therefore the UN system should implement a coherent development strategy for better inter-agency coordination as well as a better coordination between these institutions and States or actors in the field (NGOs, associations, regional organizations), and then favor a better outcome of the projects. Indeed, "sustainable development requires a firm partnership between the authorities and the civil society".67 These projects should above all take into account the desires of the local populations and help them carry out and favor the emergence of a civil society. At the same time, these populations should receive everything they may need as far as technological advance is concerned. Their development should also integrate restraints due to environment matters (e.g., water problem, desertification, soil fertilization, and urbanization). Northern countries must share their technological progress, their experience and their ‘expertise’, which by the way may stop or reduce the brain drain of citizens of the South. In short, it is of primary importance that the wealthiest countries help poor countries to develop their own economic, technological and human potential. Therefore, as Jean-Paul Marthoz has said, "the world needs less humanitarian interference than worldwide sharing".68
The second pillar of UN action must be crisis and conflict prevention. Development is also in itself a form of prevention. Preventive diplomacy (through fact-finding missions, preventive deployment, good offices and mediation) is another set of methods of prevention. Both take place in a broad conception of international security. As a former UN Secretary-General has said, "we can prevent new emerging conflicts only if we have much wider and global conception of the very notion of security".69 Indeed prevention is not restricted to arms control, pacific settlement of disputes, disarmament (especially through the banning of the use and the manufacturing of landmines), but also concerns economic security, social security, and cultural security.70 The need to improve the international community’s ability to prevent crises has been recognized by the G8 at Cologne. The G8 has especially expressed the need "to strengthen the capacity of the UN in this area".71 But in this matter, States still have to prove their will to transform their deeds into action. Prevention is linked to the holding and the analysis of an independent and interdisciplinary information72, to a radical change in the way to adjust occurrences, crisis, and problem. One must, on one hand, favor the long-term in opposition to the emergency, and, on the other hand, find again "the capacity to give answers to warnings"73 and to learn to "invest in the intangible".74 The problem of the information is a crucial one for the UN, because information is at the heart of any action, and because the data analysis governs its processing. Information should not only be independent, but also as precise, detailed, non divided, or fragmented between several services, as possible; and should constantly be updated. The UN cannot just receive official data from Member States, at the risk of sometimes coming to ill-considered or erroneous conclusions.75 On the contrary it must lead an analysis that takes into account all the aspects of a problem, to detect all its root causes, and avoid stereotypes, value judgement or ethnocentrism.76 This is fundamental in order to secure the objectivity of the Organization, to develop its function of expertise, and to give the decisive impetus for the creation of an early-warning system. The gathering of diversified information from several sources and by leading many field missions allows to grasp complex situations, to understand societies, and therefore to act before a conflict breaks out. In addition, this method based on proximity would empower the feeling of security of the populations, as well as the credibility of the work of UN institutions that would be closer to the preoccupations and the history of those populations. This preventive action is carried out on the long run, by anticipation; it is never ending, but constantly evaluated and innovative. It must both "conciliate universal values and the respect of particularisms"77, as well as promote the idea of progress and at the same time combine tradition and modernity.
If prevention is the second aspect of peace-building, the enhancement of a ‘culture of peace’ is its third. It is furthermore the most efficient means to fight the surrounding ‘culture of violence’, even though maybe the most difficult one to implement. Indeed, the culture of peace deals with behaviors, prejudice, lack of communication, and intolerance. To refute the ‘culture of violence’ is to render illegitimate power struggles, the use of force to settle disputes, and violent behaviors. The ‘culture of peace’ is the non-violent management of crisis and conflicts; it is the implementation of democratic procedures and the respect of fundamental human rights; it is the participation of all the layers of the society to a constructive dialogue. In short "it is the building of a framework of justice, dignity, equality and solidarity".78 The culture of peace is a concept that takes into account the place of individuals in the day-to-day peace-building. In a sense, it is what Norbert Ropers called, a "transnational challenge"79. For all these actions, the UN must become an international regulatory framework which is a driving force, that focalizes the energies around clearly set economic, social, cultural aspirations, and managed at a reasonable pace. Within this perspective, globalization of commercial, financial, technological, or cultural exchanges is not an obstacle or an exclusion factor anymore, but rather an asset shared by everyone. This coordination of the forces of globalization must go hand in hand with the protection of the cultural and world human heritage, and with the preservation of its diversity for a greater tolerance and a better integration. These actions must be generated by an adequate functioning of the UN’s administration and a more autonomous leadership.
A Renewed Management The management of the UN system must be in tune with its culture of negotiation and consensus. Dialogue, consultations and ways of communication should therefore be established at all levels, between all services, departments and actors (civil servants, representatives, delegates, observers). Turf wars, rivalries between institutions, services or persons should give way to a cooperation beneficial to the whole system. Efficiency also requires a system of evaluation where results are really taken into account to improve programs, projects or current actions. In addition, recruitment should be made according to the competence of candidates and should not be subjected to the pressures of Member States. Therefore the management of the system should be determined by the threefold priority: expertise, training, and long-term planning.
Each UN civil servant should be considered as an expert in its field of study, whose scientific and independent conclusions are respected by States or other actors. The civil servant should be allowed to exert a real leadership in matters of orienting or choosing policies.80 Secondly, the UN should be a center of thought, a training school for teaching non-violence, intercultural and intersociety dialogue, respect of differences. This teaching would take the shape of micro-projects run in partnership with NGOs or any associations, or through the cooperation of the specialized institutions of the UN system. Finally, the UN does not have to give way to the temptation of responding to emergencies.81 Its action definitely takes place on the long-term, "to protect future generations from the scourge of war".82 It should be able to anticipate human needs, the negative consequences of the deterioration of the environment, problems generated by the uneven distribution of wealth and of natural resources. That is why the establishing of a prospective unit (attached to the Executive Office of the Secretary-General), as the ones already existing in numerous international institutions (Analysis and Forecasting Office at UNESCO, the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission, the ‘Study Program on the Long-Term Future’ at OECD), seems indispensable. It could alert public opinion to the coming challenges and the means to resolve them upstream and not downstream anymore. One should therefore welcome the creation by the UN Secretary-General of a ‘Strategic Planning Unit’ "charged with identifying emerging global issues and trends, analyzing their implications for the roles and working methods of the United Nations, and devising policy recommendations for the Secretary-General and the Senior Management Group".83 It is only that way that the World Organization will be able to regain an innovative approach, an initial even forewarning role, and therefore to assert itself as a peaceful and regulatory institution. It is this role that the UN Secretary-General should embody.
A Recognized Leadership
Recently many Member States wished to restrict the Secretary-General to a simple administrative manager. But, according to provisions of Articles 97, 98 and 99 of the Charter, the Secretary-General is not only the ‘chief administrative officer’ of the Organization, but also and mostly a political player that possesses a real power of initiative.
Article 98 gives him the right to attend "all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council", the ability to participate in the work of other organs and then the power to influence their agenda by putting on it all the questions he thinks should be submitted. Article 99 gives the Secretary-General a power of diplomatic initiative and a discretionary power on the opportunity to weigh up whether to bring a matter in front of the Security Council or not. These provisions require a personal judgement and a political choice, and, at least, allow him to make suggestions.84 The phrases "in his opinion" and "may threaten" of Article 99 allow the Secretary-General to lead preventive or anticipative actions. The recent crisis between Iraq and the United States showed that the Secretary-General can constitute a ‘third way’, a successful intermediary or moderator.
This is where the role and function of the Secretary-General should stand out: to anticipate, to denounce, to alert. Indeed, one expects from him to stand against violations of human rights in any country (whatever the reprobation or pressures might be), to warn against the consequences of particular policies, to denounce fore-warning of emerging conflicts, and to point out the inadequacies of particular actions. In short, as Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuellar rightly stated, the Secretary-General is and should be the ‘consciousness’ of the whole of mankind: "it is in the name of peoples that the Secretary-General must plead for disarmament, tolerance and solidarity".85 In this sense, it is up to him to promote some kind of ethics at the international level and to be the protector of the most powerless. By being a moral authority, the Secretary-General can have a better power of influence on States behavior, so to encourage them to respect the undertakings implied by their adherence to the UN Charter principles (even if the results of this influence is not always seen on a short-term perspective). Indeed, Kofi Annan said: "if we do not speak out, individually or collectively, today and everyday when our conscience is challenged by inhumanity and intolerance, we will not have done our duty – to ourselves, or to succeeding generations".86 In this matter, the function of information of the Secretary-General is essential. The information he possesses allow him, in an independent way, to anticipate events, to ‘mediatize’ a problem, or to suggest number of solutions.
A reinforced action aiming at exploiting the comparative advantages of the UN system, a renewed management centered on a working ethics pointing to the fulfillment of a collective project, and a strong leadership for the common benefit of the international community: these are the orientations of reform modestly proposed here. Indeed, "we have [today] before us the opportunity to combine the ongoing, incremental [thus structural] process of reform with a comprehensive vision of the future. The legacy of the founders at this half-century mark should be our inspiration. ... Together we can bring the world of the Charter to the world of today".87
CONCLUSION
Despite a world in perpetual evolution, transformed by the globalization and fragmentation, even the ‘fractalization’88, the principles and purposes stated in the preamble and Article I of the UN Charter are still valid. Multilateralism or the collective management of world affairs are still relevant for the kaleidoscopic needs of the present, and within today’s plural, complex and interdependent world. In this perspective, the missions and actions of the United Nations should convince the several actors of the international system that "the very power lies in collective action".89 However, these principles and purposes must also be adapted to today’s world through revitalized structures such as a reformed and more representative Security Council, a stronger partnership between the UN and regional organizations, with the setting up of a stronger and better organized international civil society that would act as a safeguard to immoderate consequences of globalization. The UN must also be endowed with structures that help the Security Council to decide and act by anticipation and according to preventive methods. Therefore, a center for analysis and forecasting, as well as a center for conflict prevention should be established and attached to the Security Council. The UN must also take into account more regularly ‘new’ international values: rights of human beings, moral ethics, democracy, a renewed social contract.90
The United Nations Organization is and remains the best instrument of multilateral diplomacy and an essential mechanism of ‘global governance’ built for States and at their permanent disposal.91 However, a positive reform of the Organization will come up against two main problem: the uneven investment of States and the perception of national interests. In a global world, national interest cannot be restricted to the limits of a territory anymore. National problems are also, and more and more international ones, or, at least, have worldwide repercussion. For example, the control of water cannot be dealt with through national interests, but rather within a regional framework. States should reinforce their cooperation and trust each other much more. For now the conclusion of the process of UN reform (the structural as well as the conceptual one) come up against the will of each Member State to maximize its interests or positions within each working group, organ, institution or program. Such a limit should be overcome by the adoption of a common global vision on problems of the world and through the recognition that the UN does not stand, nor act on, the same level as States. Above all, the United Nations does not act against them, but for the benefit of their populations. It is this complementary action of the UN that should be underlined. It can, more than States do, act as an arbiter, as an initiator, as a stabilizing and regulatory power within the international system. Therefore, what is needed is less to change the institution, or to fundamentally modify the texts (even if some ‘cleaning-up’ of certain articles seem necessary), but rather to strictly apply, along with a broader interpretation, the articles of the Charter. The links between peace, development and human security are already written between the lines in the Charter. Finally, the UN must regain its relevance on the more general point of view of values. Far from depreciating individual values (but only the ones that concern the withdrawal into oneself and the intolerance), UN’s action allows everybody to become aware of the necessary acceptance of universal and common values, the single purpose of which is to protect the planet and the heritage inherited by several generations and civilizations. As Edgar Morin said, "just as a living communication must be established between the past, the present and the future, just as well a living and permanent communication should be established between cultural, ethnic, national singularities, and the concrete universe of a Mother-Earth for all".92 Therefore, "the adoption of a global scale way of looking at things is the utmost condition of our survival".93
Many ways to give greater authority, credibility and efficiency to the United Nations Organization, to its system and actions. This is indispensable for improving the living conditions of this world and the understanding of the actors evolving on the international scene. In order to counter the lack of political courage and will (which sometimes reflect States’ lack of goodwill), a thorough reflection should be led within centers or structures dedicated to prospective studies, to prevention of crises and to the observation of the functioning of our societies. This reflection that deals with the reform of the UN system actually goes beyond it: it also concerns the redefinition of our relationship with time, to make evolve or to change the way democracy functions (in the direction to a wider participation of all), the awareness of the planet’s unity of destiny, and to find again the sense of the common interest. The UN can be strong again if international actors manage to meet "the challenge ... to refashion the ideal without losing the reality".94
________ Notes: This working group was established, at the call of the United States, by the resolution 49/252 (September 14th, 1995) during the 49th session of the General Assembly. The General Assembly established not less than one committee and five working groups assigned to study the future of the UN system and its actions: Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations on the Strengthening of the rile of the Organization; High-Level Open-ended Working Group on the Strengthening of the United Nations; Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in Membership of the Security Council; Open-ended Working Group on the Agenda for peace; Ad-hoc Open-ended Working Group on the Agenda for development; High-Level Open-ended Working Group on the Financial Situation of United Nations. Among others: the Ramphal/Carlsson Report ("Our Global Neighborhood"), the Qureshi/Weizsäcker Report ("The United Nations in its Second-Half-Century: A Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations"), the Ogata/Volker Report ("Financing an Effective United Nations: A Report of the Independent Working Advisory Group on UN Financing"), and the South Centre Report ("For a strong and democratic United Nations: A South Perspective on UN Reform"), and a special issues of Futures (vol. 27, n° 2, March 1995) on "The United Nations at Fifty: Policy and Financing Alternatives" edited by Harlan Cleveland, Hazel Henderson and Inge Kaul. The United States published in February and April two documents of detailed proposals on the topic of the UN reform: "US Views on Reform Measures Necessary For Strengthening The United Nations System" (February 1996), and "Preparing the United Nations for Its Second Fifty Years" (April 1996). Lyons Summit formulated, among others, new proposals in the economic and social field, and insisted on the immediate and rapid implementation of the reforms related to the coordination of the organs of the UN system, and to budgetary cuts. The G7 suggested to merge the three departments dealing with economic and social matters within the Secretariat into a single one. This recommendation was implemented by Kofi Annan in his plan of reforms. The United States owes the Organization, on September 30th, 1999, $1,6 billion. On November 18th, the American Congress agreed on the payment (in several portions) of $926 million of the US arrears. This will avoid the United States to loose its right of vote in the General Assembly by January 2000. Still, this payment does solve the problem of the American UN debt and is partly conditioned to the reduction of the US share of the UN budget (from 25% to 22% of the regular budget). Documents ‘Track I’ (A/51/829) of March 17th, 1997, and ‘Track II’ (A/51/950) of July 14th, 1997. The UN Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration, October 24th, 1995. To quote Jacques Lesourne (Les mille sentiers de l’avenir, 1981, Paris). Interview with Mr. Jérôme Bindé, Director of the Analysis and Forecasting Office at UNESCO in Paris. According to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, there is not just one process of globalization, but many forms of globalization, each one having its own specificity and pace. See "21st Century Talks", UNESCO, Le Monde, April 28th, 1998. See Chapters 2 and 3 of the Human Development Report 1994, UNDP. Kofi Annan, "Peace Operations and the United Nations: Preparing for the Next Century", February 1996. Irnerio Seminatore, "Les relations internationales de l'après-guerre froide: une mutation globale", Etudes internationales, 27(3), September 1996, p. 605. G. Achcar (Le Monde diplomatique, October 1995, p. 9) quoting an article published in the International Herald Tribune, "Going It Alone and Multilateralism Aren’t Leadership", February 4-5th, 1995. Zaki Laïdi, "Le rite médiatique du G7", Libération, June 15th, 1996. Béatrice Pouligny, "Force armée de l’ONU ou nouvelle ONU?", Etudes, March 1994, p. 304. Irnerio Seminatore, 1996: 611. See Zaki Laïdi, Un monde privé de sens, 1994, Paris, Fayard. Even if this alternative has ended up with authoritarian régimes as well as with human and humanitarian disasters ! Also note that the "decline of great narratives" actually preceded the end of the Cold War, and has been announced, for example, as soon as 1979 in a prophetic essay by the philosopher Jean-François Lyotard, La condition post-moderne, 1979, Paris, éditions de Minuit. Zaki Laïdi, "L’urgence est mauvaise conseillère du prince", Libération, October 11th, 1996. See on this topic the remarkable analysis of Éric de la Maisonneuve (La violence qui vient, 1997, Arléa) and Edgar Morin / Sami Naïr (Une politique de civilisation, 1997, Arléa). Richard J. Poncio, "Beyond 1995: negotiating a new UN through Article 109", Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 20(1), Winter/Spring 1996, p. 152. Article 1, paragraph 3, expresses the need "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character". Ghassan Salamé, Appels d’empire: ingérence et résistances à l’âge de la mondialisation, 1996, p. 87. Edgar Morin, 1997: 25. Eric de la Maisonnneuve, 1997: 19. Eric de la Maisonneuve (1997: 215) quoting Jean Guitton (La pensée et la guerre, 1969). Pierre Hassner, "Par delà la guerre et la paix: violence et intervention après la guerre froide", Etudes, 1996. Samuel A. Makinda, "Sovereignty and International Security: Challenges for the United Nations", Global Governance, 2(2), May-August 1996, pp. 149-168. Declaration of the President of the UN Security Council, January 31st, 1992. Stanley Hoffmann, "Thoughts on the UN at Fifty", European Journal of International Law, 6(3), 1995, p. 321. Georges Kiejman, mentioning the "Algerian tragedy", considers that "the very grounds for existence of the United Nations Organization" is not to protect nations, but "men, women, children that constitute them". "Le drame algérien et la Charte des Nations Unies", Le Monde, January 13th, 1998. Ghassan Salamé, 1996: 150. During this Summit, a series of consultative forums were established by local authorities, NGOs, representatives of the private sector, "whose conclusions [were] the subject of reports and recommendations likely to have a direct effect on negotiations". See article of Mr. Jérôme Bindé, "The City Summit: The Lessons of Istanbul", Futures, 29(3), 1997, p. 218. For example, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities (subsidiary organ of the Commission on Human Rights) gives, during its annual debate, the floor firstly to non governmental organizations. Bruce Russett, "Ten Balances for Weighing UN Reform Proposals", Political Science Quarterly, 111(2), Summer 1996, p. 259-269. Zaki Laïdi, "La mondialisation tue-t-elle l’universel?", Sources UNESCO, n° 79, May 1996. See his article: "Saving the UN: A Challenge to the Next Secretary-General", Foreign Affairs, 75(5), September/October 1996, pp. 2-7. See Maurice BERTRAND / Daniel Warner (ed.), A New Charter for a Worldwide Organization, 1996, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 288 pages. "The United Nations remains, first and last, simply an organization of member states, with little or no independent power, and with its ultimate effectiveness dependent on the unity of the major powers". George Soros (Chairman), "American National Interest and the United Nations", Statement and Report of an Independent Task Force on the United Nations, August 1996, p. 3. Ghassan Salamé, 1996: 137-138. UNU Public Forum Report, The United Nations System in the 21st Century, May 1996, New York, p. 1. As James Paul summarized, "people disagree sharply on what kind of reform is needed and for what purpose. NGO leaders aim for a more democratic UN, with greater openness and accountability. Technocrats seek more productivity and efficiency from the UN’s staff. Delegates favor reforms that conform to national interests and promote national power. Idealist offer plans for a greatly expanded body, that would reduce states’ sovereignty. While conservatives push for a downsized UN with sharply reduced powers. Agreement is exceedingly hard to come by". In, "UN Reform: An Analysis", Global Policy Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/analysis.htm, April 1st, 1998. Keith Krause / Andy Knight ("Evolution and Change in the UN System", p. 12), think that the evolution of the international society can be thought as dialectical process, in, State, Society, and the UN System: Changing perspectives on multilateralism, 1995, UNU Press. Paragraph 42 of the G7 Economic Communiqué at Lyons, June 1996. Ibid., paragraph 41. For example, the World Food Program and the Intergovernmental Fund for Agricultural Development are in competition with the F.A.O.; the Commission for Sustainable Development is in competition with the UN Environment Program; the UNICEF, the World Bank and the UNDP are in competition with the UNESCO in the field of education. In any case, such a reform might be very difficult to implement, because the heads of the specialized agencies are not deputies of the UN Secretary-General, but heads of independent bodies. At the beginning of March 1997, James Wolfensohn had issued a plan of reforms for the World Bank aiming at four major purposes: the need to relieve the central services to become closer to the field; to reorient the development policy towards the social; to give more efficient the unique world’s economic and social data base; to develop a strategy of human resources and training. In, Les Echos, March 1997. For example, the policies of structural adjustment imposed by the I.M.F. and the World Bank did not for a long time take into account the social policies recommended by the I.L.O., the UNICEF, the F.A.O. or the UNESCO. This is also due to the "verticality" of the system which makes every institution independent. See the relevant article of Alain DESTEXHE, "L’ONU au chevet du monde", Politique internationale, été 1993, n° 60, pp. 195-208. James Paul, "UN Reform: An Analysis", op. cit. (note 44). S. Cortembert underlines, "by means of wanting a decentralized system, a new organ has been created each time a new international question was coming up. International responsibilities have thus been spread among numerous important organs". Workshop at the University of Besançon, L’ONU, 50 ans après: bilan et perspectives, March 29-30th, 1995, p. 44. ‘Tobin Tax’ (tax on international transactions currencies), See Human Development Report 1994, p.75. Other proposals were made in Chapter 5 of the Ramphal/Carlsson Report (tax on plane tickets, on sea traffic,...). Information given by the Bulletin du Centre d’information des Nations Unies à Paris, n° 19, May 1996, p. 38. Figures given by the UN Department of Information, March 1996, DPI/1753/Rev.3. Quoted by Jérôme Bindé, 1997: 226. As Olga Pellicer said, "the strengthening of the United Nations at the end of this century will depend on its ability to return to a vision of the Organization which is less ambitious and more in tune with its real capacity and with the feeling of the majority of the Organization’s members". International Revue of Social Sciences, n° 144, June 1995, p. 352. Pierre Hassner, 1996. Federico Mayor, "Fifty Years On", UNESCO Courier, October 1995, p. 6. To quote the title of the G7 Economic Communiqué at Lyons. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies: entre l’urgence et la durée", Politique étrangère, Summer 1996, p. 411. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Development, 1995, §1. Words of Gro Harlem Brundtland, former chairman of the World Commission on Environment and Development. Quoted by Brian Urquhart ("Learning from the Gulf", New York Review of Books, 38(5), 7 mars 1991, p. 36) who adds that "one of the most important questions of our time is whether sustainable development on a worldwide scale is attainable". As Burhan Ghalioun said, "the economic competition cannot constitute a raison d’être for a society, neither can it give a meaning to the human existence", in, "La déstabilisation du monde", Défense nationale, April 1996. Agenda for Peace, 1992, paragraph 80. With $44 billion in 1997, public development aid provided by rich countries counted for only 0,21% of their GNP, which is the lowest figure since the 1950s. A/49/665, November 11th, 1994, §17. Jean-Paul Marthoz, "Everything has change, except ourselves", GRIP, October 1995, p. 174. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1996: 412. Ambassador Hector Gross Espiell, who adds that "without this global conception of security, we will remain within a narrow framework that is not compatible with the current reality". Conference at the UNESCO, January 25th, 1996. G8 Communiqué Köln, paragraph 40. See Maurice Bertrand’s article, "Vers une stratégie de prévention des confits", Politique étrangère, Spring 1997, pp. 111-123. Zaki Laïdi, "Le rite médiatique du G7", Libération, June 15th, 1996. Federico Mayor, "A New Beginning", UNESCO Courier, November 1995, p. 7. See article of François Moricoui-Ebrard, "Explosion urbaine, le sens de la démesure", Le Monde diplomatique, July 1996, p. 13. For a relevant analysis of these problems, see Gérard Prunier, "Manipulation humanitaire", Le Monde des débats, n° 21, July-August 1994, p. 5. Michel Wieviorka, Le Monde, October 8th, 1996. Federico Mayor, "Fifty Years On", The UNESCO Courier, October 1995, p. 6. Norbert Ropers, "The culture of peace and the promotion of a culture of constructive conflict management", July 1994. These lacuna are missed by the former Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuellar, talking about his economic advisers. "Reflecting on the past and contemplating the future", Global Governance, 1(2), May-August 1995, p. 151. This does not mean the UN should neglect the situations that require an urgent action (epidemics, populations displacements...). In these cases, the Organization should also have a rapid reaction capacity, especially in the humanitarian field. However anticipation and preventive action should limit those actions in emergency. Quote from the UNESCO’s Constitution. Paragraph 39 of the reform plan ‘Track II’. However this unit does not seem to receive all the political support it is needed, and is only dealing with the preparation of the Millenium Assembly which is a quite reducing role. Article 99 was formally invoked three times: during the Congo crisis in July 1960 (Dag Hammarskjöld), during the episode of the Americans hostages in Teheran in November 1979 (Kurt Waldheim), and in relation with the situation in Lebanon in 1989 (Javier Pérez de Cuellar). Javier Pérez de Cuellar, "Le rôle du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies", Revue générale de droit international public, 1985, n°2. Statement at the opening of the 44th session of the Commission on Human Rights, March 16th, 1998, Geneva, SG/SM/98/53. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Confronting New Challenges", Annual Report on the Work of the Organization, 1995, New York, United Nations, paragraph 1006. The ‘fractalization’ concept indicates the multidimensionality, the fragmentation of today’s polycentric world. See article of Jean de Maillard, "Le crime à venir: vers une société fractale", Le débat, n° 94, March-April 1997. "Mythes et réalités de la mondialisation", Esprit, November 1996. See Federico MAYOR (avec la collaboration de Jérôme Bindé), Un monde nouveau, 1999, Paris, éditions Odile Jacob, 526 pages. See also See Federico MAYOR and Jérôme Bindé, "The 21st Century: A Better World or a Brave New World, Foresight, 1(5), October 1999, pp. 389-391. A mechanism that can be improved through a better integration of numerous and new actors in the UN methods of decision-making, through a greater degree of democracy within the system, and through the settlement of the existing tensions between human and institutional values. See A.J.R. Groom, "Global Governance and the United Nations", in, The United Nations at Fifty: Prospects and Retrospect, 1996, New-Zealand, p. 297. Edgar Morin, "Our Common Home", The UNESCO Courier, November 1995. Federico Mayor, "The Price of Peace", The UNESCO Courier, November 1995. David CARON, in Proceedings of the 87th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 1993, Washington DC, p. 310. Published on stratisc.org with permission of author and editor. |
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